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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PRO
CEDURE

6(e):

CRIMINAL OR CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATIONS OF

GRAND JURY SECRECY?
INTRODUCTION

The grand jury has evolved from its English origins as a vehicle to
serve the will of the king! to its function today as an investigatory
body that both assists the prosecutor in bringing criminal accusations
and protects the innocent against unjustified prosecutions. 2 Similarly,
the secrecy required of grand juries has developed to serve the compet
ing interests of the government's criminal investigations and of the in
dividual's liberty.3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides
for secrecy in grand jury investigations. 4
1. Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REv. 590, 590
(1961).
2. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) (A grand jury serves the
"dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. "); M.
FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 19 (1977)
("[A]ll grand juries have a common function: to determine if there is sufficient evidence to
warrant putting the subject of an investigation on trial, where the question of guilt or inno
cence can be determined."); Stem, Revealing Misconduct by Public Officials Through Grand
Jury Reports, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 73, 83 (1987) ("It is generally agreed, however, that in its
development the grand jury had sharpened its sword to a fine point long before it acquired
its shield.").
3. See United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he grand jury
is as a matter of fact an investigative arm of the prosecutor's office, as a matter of theory it
is a protection for the liberty of the subject ....").
4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides in relevant part:
(e) RECORDING AND DISCLOSURE OF PROCEEDINGS.
(1) Recording 0/ Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury
is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic
recording device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or
any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The
recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in
the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise or
dered by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule o/Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer,
an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
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The grand jury's dual functions of "sword and shield"5 are em
bodied in the text and legislative history of Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 6 This same dual principle is found in
the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e), where Congress amended the rule
"to facilitate an increasing need, on the part of Government attorneys
to make use of outside expertise in complex litigation."7 As a conse
quence of the 1977 amendments, the rule enhanced the "sword" as
pect of secrecy by loosening the restrictions on disclosure of grand jury
materials in order to assist the government in its investigatory func
tion. 8 However, to curtail or discourage abuse of the grand jury, the
"shield" function, the rule continues to prohibit disclosure9 of "mat
ters occurring before the grand jury" except under particular circum
stances of governmental need. 10 Rule 6(e) requires an ex parte hearing
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). See infra note 10 for the text of Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
5. In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury Impaneled January, 1969, 315 F. Supp.
662, 671 (D. Md. 1970) ("The Grand Jury is both a sword and a shield."). See generally
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1985), stating that the grand jury:
is likened to a shield in its operation as a screening agency interposed between the
government and the individual. ... [T]he grand jury ... "protect[s] the individual
Citizen against oppressive and unfounded government prosecution." The grand
jury is likened to a sword in its performance as an investigative agency.... Utiliz
ing its investigative authority, the grand jury uncovers evidence not previously
available to the prosecution, and thereby provides the sword that enables the gov
ernment to secure convictions that might otherwise not be obtained.
Id. at 346.
6. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1946 enact
ment of Rule 6.
7. H.R. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT];
S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 529; H.R. Doc. No. 464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1976) [hereinafter HOUSE DOCUMENT].
8. See infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of the 1977 amendments.
9. In this Note, the term "disclosure" is used to refer to both permissible and imper
missible revelations of "matters occurring before the grand jury" as defined by Rule 6(e).
10. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) provides in relevant part:
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror,
may be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel ... as are deemed necessary by an
attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the per
formance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii)
of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attor
ney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall
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to obtain a court order for disclosure not otherwise permitted by the
rule. 11 An additional, deliberate safeguard that protects the targets of
grand jury investigations is the final sentence of Rule 6(e)(2), added in
1977, which provides a penalty of contempt for a knowing violation of
the rule. 12
Prior to the 1977 amendments, contempt was used throughout
the circuits as a sanction for violations of grand jury secrecy under the
inherent supervisory power of the courts. Since 1977, the express con
tempt provision in the rule has been cited as authority for holding
individuals in contempt of court. Two recent cases have questioned
whether contempt, as contemplated by the 1977 amendments, is civil
and/or criminal.
In the case of Blalock v. United States,13 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recognized a private cause of ac
tion seeking injunctive relief for alleged violations of Rule 6(e).
Although bound by precedent,14 two of the judges in a special concurpromptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom
such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the attorney has advised
such persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring
before the grand jury may also be made
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with
a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury;
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the dis
closure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as
the court may direct.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
11. [d. at 6(e)(C)(i)(ii); SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1977 u.S.
CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 532 ("It is contemplated that the judicial hearing in
connection with an application for a court order by the government under subparagraph
(3)(C)(i) should be ex parte so as to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, grand jury
secrecy. ").
12. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides that "[a] knowing violation
of Rule 6(e) may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
13. 844 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).
14. [d. at 1550 n.6 ("In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (l1th Cir.
1981) (en bane), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981."); see Lance v. United States Dep't of Jus
tice, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980). The Lance court was the first court to recognize a
private cause of action allowing a target to invoke the civil contempt power of the court,
while not discussing whether a target has standing to seek such relief or whether the relief
sought was criminal or civil. S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE
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rence lS disagreed with the reasoning that led the majority to recognize
the right of an individual to invoke the civil contempt powers of the
court. 16 The concurring judges argued that the text and legislative
history of Rule 6(e) indicated that violations of grand jury secrecy are
enforced solely with criminal contempt sanctions.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia Circuit, the majority, in Barry v. United States,17 relying on the
holding in Blalock as persuasive precedent, recognized a private cause
of action invoking the contempt power of the court. The dissent in
Barry agreed with the Blalock special concurrence that Rule 6(e)(2) is
solely a criminal contempt provision. IS The dissent in Barry disagreed
with the majority for its failure to consider a criminal contempt sanc
tion in light of the fact that the court, in this instance, was not bound
by precedent as were the judges in Blalock. 19
The majority opinion in both cases recognized the private cause
of action for injunctive relief invoking the civil contempt power of the
court for violations of Rule 6(e).· Although recognizing the remedy of
civil contempt, the Blalock court did so only because of binding prece
dent, not because of analytic agreement with the mandated result.
The apparent consistency in the two results does not clarify the under
lying disagreement about the nature of the contempt remedy in Rule
6(e), which is the focus of this Note.
This Note will examine the special concurrence in Blalock and
the dissent in Barry and compare and contrast them with the majority
opinion in Barry as a way of determining whether the express con
tempt provision in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) is crim
inal and/or civil. Part I of the Note examines the historical evolution
of grand jury secrecy and its incorporation into the American criminal
justice system. The legislative history of Rule 6(e) will be examined in
Part II, with particular emphasis on the 1977 amendments. The in
herent supervisory powers of the courts as they relate to both criminal
and civil contempt will be examined generally in Part III. Addition
ally, Part III will examine the nature, purposes and possible definitions
of criminal and civil contempt. Part IV discusses cases where grand
jury secrecy violations were alleged. Cases prior to 1977 will be ex
§ 1020.50 (Supp. 1989). See infra notes 224-41 and accompanying text for a detailed dis
cussion of the Lance case.
15. 844 F.2d at 1552 (Tjoftat, J., Roettger, J., specially concurring).
16. 610 F.2d at 212.
17. 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
18. Id. at 1322 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1326.
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amined for applications of the safeguards used by the courts before the
enactment of the contempt provision in Rule 6(e). Cases since 1977
will be explored to help illuminate the current application of the rule.
Part V of the Note examines the Blalock and Barry decisions in detail.
Part VI focuses on the special concurrence in Blalock and the majority
opinion in Barry to determine if criminal contempt was the sole con
tempt sanction intended by Congress when it enacted the 1977 amend
ments to Rule 6(e).
This Note suggests that the legislative history is unclear about the
nature of the contempt remedy in Rule 6(e). The underlying philoso
phy and history of grand jury secrecy, regularly recognized by the
Supreme Court, must be considered in any remedy for secrecy viola
tions. Traditional judicial distinctions between civil and criminal con
tempts and the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts to
fashion remedies are useful as a guide for courts confronted with gov
ernmental violations of grand jury secrecy. An analysis based on such
considerations is more effective than one based on a categorical ap
proach which eliminates civil contempt.
I.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND JURY SECRECY

Today the grand jury is primarily a way of accusing a defendant
of an alleged crime. 20 Although historically the accusatory function
was fused with the actual trial,21 the modem grand jury does not serve
as a trial jury. Currently the grand jury, which is the investigatory
arm of the government, decides only whether there is sufficient evi
dence to indict an individual who will subsequently go to trial. Func
tionally, the grand jury serves not only as a means "of bringing
persons who are suspected of crimes to trial upon just grounds, but of
protecting citizens from unfounded accusations whether from the gov
ernment, partisan passion, or personal enmity."22 This dual function
20. Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REv. 461, 462 (1959).
21. Id. (In ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and the Scandinavian countries, citi
zens accused, tried, and convicted those alleged to have committed crimes.).
22. Id. at 484-85 (citing Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992 (C.C.D. Cal.
1872»; see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), which stated:
Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the inno
cent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable
function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether
the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a
charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by
malice and personal ill will.
Id. at 390. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), Justice Harlan explained the
'.
protective function of secrecy:
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of the grand jury, serving both the governmental needs of prosecution
and the individual's needs to be protected from unwarranted charges,
has resulted in the "veil of secrecy" which historically reduced royal
control and guaranteed the independence of the grand jury.23
Although theoretically secrecy protects the target of a grand jury
probe against reputational damage, in reality secrecy also screens the
prosecutor's actions before the grand jury from public scrutiny.24
A.

Historical Development of Grand Jury Secrecy

The modem grand jury has its roots in the reign of the Carlovin
gian kings (circa 700-800 A.D.)2S whose inquisition evolved from Ro
man practices (43 A.D. to circa 500 A.D.).26 By 1166, the Assize of
Clarendon was established by Henry 11,27 whereby sixteen men under
oath informed the government on affairs of state and decided who in
the community had committed crimes. 28 The Assize drew members
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and helpless-pro
scribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an unreasoning public
clamor-have found, and will continue to find, security against official oppres
sion, the cruelty of mobs, the machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of
private persons who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their
personal enemies.
Id. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. Brown, The Witness and Grand Jury Secrecy, 11 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169, 169-71
(1983). To ensure secrecy, grand jurors were required to take an oath of secrecy in English
courts. The oath appeared as early as 1600 and violations were punishable as a crime. Id.
at 171 nn.9-1O. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the grand
jury's independence and the supervisory function of the court. See also United States v.
Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) ("The same concern for the grand jury's dual
function underlies the 'long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings in the federal courts.' " (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 681 (1958) (footnote omitted»). In In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
the court traced the history of grand jury secrecy:
Thus, it is important to note that the common law concept of grand jury secrecy
developed from a need to protect the jurors and the accused from the tyranny of
the Crown: Secrecy insulated the jurors from the pressures of the Crown and
pennitted the grand jury to guard the people against the oppressive power of
autocratic government.
Id. at 568-69.
24. See infra notes 59-64, 174-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role
of the prosecutor in grand jury investigations.
25. Whyte, supra note 20, at 463.
26. Id. at 462.
27. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 613, 613 (1983); Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a
New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 307,307 (1969).
28. M. EVANS & R. JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CoNSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 14 (1984), taken from the original Latin text contained in the appendix to Roger
of Howden's CHRONICA, which stated:
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from the community who heard testimony, deliberated in public, and
made accusations against their neighbors. 29 This procedure, which
raised a presumption of guilt, eventually resulted in a centralization
and increase of royal power. Contrary to the purposes ascribed to the
grand jury today, this community group did not protect the individ
ual's rights. 3D The Assize may have indirectly protected the individual
by screening unfounded charges, thus making the court's work more
efficient.3 1
In 1215, the Latern Council abolished the trial by ordeal and
compurgation and the accused was tried by an indicting jury. 32
"Here, it is said, the seed of the grand jury acting as a protective buffer
between the accused and government officials was sown."33 Although
1. In the first place the aforesaid King Henry, on the advice of all his bar
ons, for the preservation of peace, and for the maintenance ofjustice, has decreed
that enquiry shall be made throughout the several counties and throughout the
several hundreds through twelve of the more lawful men of the hundred and'
through four of the more lawful men of each vill upon oath that they will speak
the truth, whether there be in their hundred or vill any man accused or notori
ously suspect of being a robber or murderer or thief, or any who is a receiver of
robbers or murderers or thieves, since the lord king has been king. And let the
justices enquire into this among themselves and the sheriffs among themselves.
Id.
29. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455, 456-57 (1965).
30. See M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 2, stating that:
Henry II, in promulgating the Assize of Clarendon, was not in the least con
cerned with creating a shield for the citizen in his dealings with the state. The
Grand Assize was established to enable the king to wrest the administration of
justice from the Church and the feudal barons. The grand jury would be primar
ily a weapon for the monarch-enforcing his law, whether or not that could aptly
be called at any given time the "king's peace."
Id. at 7; Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1103 (1955), stating that:
The assize expressly provided for trial by the ordeal by water, wherein the ac
cused was slowly lowered by rope into a body of water. His innocence was vindi
cated by his sinking; if he floated, he was found guilty. For those who might
survive this ordeal, the assize specifically provided the imposition of banishment
and outlawry. These sanctions were invoked although the accusation and submis
sion to the ordeal, not necessarily based on direct evidence of guilt, might have
been solely premised on the local opinion that the prisoner was guilty. If con
victed, punishment was the loss of a foot ....
Id. at 1107 n.14.
31. Whyte, supra note 20, at 465.
32. Kuh, supra 'note 30, at 1107 ("Trial by ordeal and compurgation were finally
abandoned, partially because of church dissatisfaction with methods that, having no logical
relationship to gUilt or innocence, too often resulted in the acquittal of persons deemed to
be heretics. "). Compurgation is "the clearing of an accused person by oaths of persons who
swear to his veracity or innocence." WEBSTER'S NEW CoLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 230
(1979).
33. Whyte, supra note 20, at 465.
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the accused was now afforded some minor protection from this devel
opment, which afforded a more rational means for determining the
truth, he was not completely free of royal control of the grand jury.
Not only was the panel that had accused the defendant unlikely to
acquit at trial, the royal judges regularly fined and imprisoned jurors
who found the defendant not guilty.34 Given that such contradictory
behavior was disfavored by the Crown, the accused did not have much
hope for success at later judicial proceedings. 35
The modem notion of the grand jury "stems directly from the
'grande inquest' of twenty-three men which sheriffs began to appoint
during the time of Edward 111."36 In the fourteenth century, the prac
tice of hearing witnesses in private became a feature of the grand
jury.37 However, the rule of secrecy was not part of the proceedings
until 1681 at the trial of the Earl of Shaftsbury, where members of the
grand jury heard the charges of treason and refused to conduct the
proceedings in public or allow the presence of the royal prosecutors
during testimony. 38 The subsequent refusal of the grand jury to indict
the accused raised a case of treason to a symbol against oppression and
despotism of the royal power. Secrecy became the touchstone of
34. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALlS, supra note 2, at 9 (It is unlikely that this punish
ment is the ancestor of sanctions for violations of grand jury secrecy, because it was directly
related to a violation of the royal will rather than a sanction to protect the individual's
rights.).
35. Whyte, supra note 20, at 466.
36. Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. REV.
290, 293 (1959).
37. Whyte, supra note 20, at 466.
38. Pickholz & Pickholz, Grand Jury Secrecy and the Administrative Agency: Bal

ancing Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against Traditional Safeguards, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1029-30 (1979); see also L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 9-12
(1975). The grand jury was often the center ofpolitica1 struggles. Shaftsbury and his fol
lower, Stephen Colledge, supported the continued hegemony of the Anglican Church dur
ing the reign of Charles II, an avowed Catholic. The king's attempts to indict Shaftsbury
and Colledge in public were met with the concerns of the grand jurors who thought "sus
pects would be alerted and would abscond, and suborning of perjury would be facilitated."
Id. at 10. It is possible that the resistance to the royal authority stemmed from religious
sympathies with the accused rather than any laudatory notions of establishing the indepen
dence of the grand jury. The king was able to have an indictment returned against Col
ledge by a more favorable grand jury. Shaftsbury fled England to escape the same fate.
The foreman of the grand jury that refused to indict Colledge in London was arrested and
forced to flee the country, further evidencing the king's control of the grand jury system.
See generally Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role ofthe Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 701, 710-21 (1972); Comment, Federal Grand Jury Secrecy, 5 GONZ. L. REv. 255,
256 (1970) ("[A] significant change in the grand jury's function came ... in 1681. ...
[W]ith the Lord Shaftsbury case, the tide of history changed, and the grand jury grew more
independent from the Crown." (footnotes omitted».
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grand jury independence. 39

B. Grand Jury Secrecy in American Criminal Procedure
The rule of secrecy in England stemmed from "the desire to pro
tect ... defendants and the existence of the grand jury itself."4O Eng
lish legal institutions and attitudes, such as the fear of government
oppression, were brought to this country. The colonial experience
under British rule underscored the wisdom of a healthy distrust of
centralized government. In addition to overseeing the welfare of the
community,41 colonial grand juries protested abuses by the English
royal emissaries and urged the people to support the independence of
the colonies. 42
In the most celebrated case of colonial grand jury independence
in this country, a New York grand jury mirrored the earlier English
grand jury refusal to bow to royal authority. In 1734, William Cosby,
the English governor of New York, sought two indictments for crimi
nallibel against Peter Zenger, a journalist who had published articles
critical of Cosby. The grand jury refused to indict both times and
Zenger was able to thwart subsequent attempts to punish him.43 The
grand jury's ability to protect against royal excesses was once again
hailed as a bulwark against despotism.
After the end of British rule, the Americans incorporated the fear
of repression into the Bill of Rights in the fifth amendment guarantee,
"[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
39. M. FRANKEL & G. NAfTALIS, supra note 2, at 9 ("About the same time, the
grand jury began to hear testimony in private, a practice that gave rise to grand jury se
crecy, which remains a fundamental concept today."); see Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note
38, at 1030.
40. Comment, supra note 27, at 308.
41. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634-1941 2 (1963) ("Grand juries acted in the nature of local assemblies: making
known the wishes of the people, proposing new laws, protesting against abuses in govern
ment, performing administrative tasks, and looking after the welfare of their
communities. ").
42. M. FRANKEL & G. NAfTALIS, supra note 2, at 11-12; see also L. CLARK, supra
note 38, at 13 (The first grand jury was established in Massachusetts in 1635 and by 1683
all the colonies had a grand jury in some form.). See generally Whyte, supra note 20, at
466-71 (The Governor of Virginia ordered justices to make court proceedings as close as
possible to English legal institutions.).
43. Kuh, supra note 30, at 1108-09. The date of 1734 for the Peter Zenger incident
does not have unanimous agreement in the secondary sources. M. FRANKEL & G.
NAfTALIS, supra note 2, at 11, give the date as 1743. The Note, supra note I, at 590, gives
the date as 1734, which agrees with the Kuh article, supra note 30, at 1108-09 n.19. Yet
another date (1735) is given in L. CLARK, supra note 38, at 18.
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Jury."44 By incorporation into the Bill of Rights, which was intended
"mainly for the security of personal rights,"45 the Americans recog
nized that the "ultimate function of the secrecy privilege was for the
protection of the rights of the accused. "46 The American grand jury
was a close cousin to its English counterpart and operated similarly to
the English mode1. 47 Although the grand jury remains intact in the
federal sphere, it is not required in state criminal prosecutions. In
1859, Michigan became the first state to eliminate the requirement
that a criminal prosecution be initiated by a grandjury.48 In 1884, the
United States Supreme Court held that the requirement of an indict
ment by the grand jury was not applicable to the states. 49
The Supreme Court has upheld the need for grand jury secrecy in
44. u.s. CONST. amend. V; see also United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc. 463 U.S. 418,
423 (1983) ("The grand jury has always occupied a high place as an instrument ofjustice in
our system of criminallaw-so much so that it is enshrined in the Constitution." (citing
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959»; Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956». But see M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2,
at 118-19, where the authors discuss the fact that there have been many suggestions for
reform, including abolition of the grand jury. "The effort to alter the Fifth Amendment
encounters a deep-seated conviction among many constitutional lawyers and scholars that
it is dangerous to tamper with any part of the Bill of Rights, which has remained exactly as
it was adopted nearly two hundred years ago. Any change ... may be the start of fatal
breaches." Id. at 118.
45. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. I, 6 (1887).
46. Knudsen, Pretrial Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 60 F.R.D. 237,
241-42 (1974).
47. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 (1956) (The grand jury was "brought to this country
by the early colonists and incorporated in the Constitution by the Founders. There is every
reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially
like its English progenitor."); Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 38, at 1030. But see M.
FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, at 16 (The grand jury was abolished in England in
1933.); Knudsen, supra note 46, at 237 n.3 (The English abolished the grand jury system
because it was an expensive burden on the citizenry ,that performed no useful function.).
48. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, at 16.
49. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Court held that:
Tried by these principles, we are unable to say that the substitution for a
presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information, after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of
the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross
examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of
law.... It is merely a preliminary proceeding, and can result in no final judg
ment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial, conducted precisely as
in cases of indictments.
Id. at 538; see also Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 688 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The basis for this
distinction results from the now well-settled constitutional holding that the Fifth Amend
ment right to a grand jury does not apply to state prosecutions." (quoting Aldridge v.
Marshall, 765 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986) (citations
omitted»).
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American criminal procedure. 50 Confidentiality of grand jury pro
ceedings protects several important, yet often competing, interests of
the government and of private citizens. This tradition of secrecy,
which had its historical roots in England, is, according to the Supreme
Court, as "important for the protection of the innocent as for the pur
suit of the guilty."51 Justice Brennan summed up the rationale:
Essentially four reasons have been advanced as justification for
grand jury secrecy. (1) To prevent the accused from escaping before
he is indicted and arrested or from tampering with the witnesses
against him. (2) To prevent disclosure of derogatory information
presented to the grand jury against an accused who has not been
indicted. (3) To encourage complainants and witnesses to come
before the grand jury and speak freely without fear that their testi
mony will be made public thereby subjecting them to possible dis
comfort or retaliation. (4) To encourage the grand jurors to engage
in uninhibited investigation and deliberation by barring disclosure
of their votes and comments during the proceedings. 52

The four principal reasons given by Justice Brennan incorporate
the traditional rationale for grand jury secrecy: the "sword" which
aids the state in effective criminal investigations and the "shield"
which protects both the accused and the grand jurors from govern
mental intrusion and oppression. The fourth reason, protection of the
grand jurors, is of "paramount importance."53 Rule 6(e) prohibits
either disclosure or recording of the grand jury's deliberations or
votes54 because citizens who assume the duty of grand juror must be
protected by law to prevent any subsequent injury that might result
from public knowledge of their discussions. Grand jury deliberations
and votes are kept permanently secret. The first reason is important to
50. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983); Douglas Oil Co. v.
Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958); United States v. 10hnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
51. 319 U.S. at 513.
52. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395,405 (1959) (Brennan,
1., dissenting) (foot~ote omitted); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1954); see also United States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727, 729 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (Secrecy
of the grand jury is an administrative necessity.); Application of United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (Secrecy before the indictment
protects the accused in case no indictment is returned against him. If an indictment is
returned it prevents possible prejudice at trial.); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283,
304 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (The rule of secrecy is not for the benefit of the defendant after an
indictment has been returned. The rule protects the grand jurors and helps the government
in its prosecution.).
53. Calkins, supra note 29, at 459.
54. See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 6(e)(I).

256

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:245

the government because an accused may flee before he can be appre
hended and placed in custody if he knows of charges pending against
him.!!!! Additionally, the accused could collude with witnesses to tes
tify falsely on his behalf. The third reason is also important to the
government during the preparation phase of its investigation. "Se
crecy is the state's inducement for obtaining evidence"56 sufficient for
an indictment. Only the second reason addresses the need of an indi
vidual to be protected against public condemnation or suspicion. Per
manent secrecy of the grand jury materials is required to protect a
"
target who is unindicted by the grand jury. 57
Historical and political realities remain embedded in the contin
ued respect accorded grand jury secrecy by the jUdiciary. 58 However,
"the current reality of how the federal grand jury operates reveals a less
55. Knudsen, supra note 46, at 240 ("Although there is disagreement as to the origi
nal reasons for grand jury proceedings being held in secret, the most likely reason was to
prevent offenders from learning of the proceedings and attempting to escape prosecution."
(footnote omitted».
56. Calkins, supra note 29, at 459.
57. Id. at 460.
58. In United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983), the defendants were
indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to defraud the United States through de
fense contracts. In Ii plea bargain, the defendants agreed to plead guilty to a count of
conspiracy to obstruct an IRS investigation. The government moved for disclosure of the
grand jury materials to attorneys in the Civil Division for use in a possible civil suit. The
Supreme Court held that the government attorneys in the Civil Division could not have
automatic access to such materials. The government had to obtain a court order under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(C)(i). Rule 6(A)(i)'s provisions of automatic access
are limited to attorneys involved in the criminal investigation before the grand jury. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
This conclusion is mandated by the general purposes and policies of grand jury
secrecy ... and by the legislative history of Rule 6(e).
Given the strong historic policy of preserving grand jury secrecy, one might
wonder why Government attorneys are given any automatic access at all .
. . . [Disclosure] threatens to do affirmative mischief. The problem is three
fold. First, disclosure to Government bodies raises much the same concerns that
underlie the rule of secrecy in other contexts .... [A witness] may be less willing
to speak for fear that he will get himself into trouble in some other forum.
Second, because the Government takes an active part in the activities of the
grand jury, disclosure to Government attorneys ... poses a significant threat to
the integrity of the grand jury itself. . . .
Third, ... there are few if any other forums in which a governmental body
has such relatively unregulated power to compel other persons to divulge infor
mation or produce evidence.... [T]he limitations imposed on investigation and
discovery exist for sound reasons--ranging from fundamental fairness to concern
about burdensomeness and intrusiveness.
Id. at 427-28, 431-33 (citation omitted).
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clear picture of an independent body cautiously supervised by the
court.
Noteworthy in the traditional purposes and policies advanced by
the Supreme Court for preserving secrecy of the grand jury is the ab
sence of any rationale supporting the government's need to keep its
investigatory behavior (as opposed to "matters occurring before the
grand jury," as required in Rule 6(e)) from public scrutiny. 59 The
freedom that secrecy provides to the grand jurors to investigate and to
the witnesses to testify is not historically related to sheltering the gov
ernment from any judicial or public scrutiny of its practices. This as
pect of the grand jury has been criticized: "Save for torture, it would
be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of
unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination. . . . [T]he Supreme
Court has shown itself extremely sensitive to the opportunities for op
pression that such examination offers."60
As its inception at the trial of Shaftsbury indicates, the secrecy
provision originally precluded the presence of the government. The
erosion of this concept has resulted in the prosecutor exercising discre
59. Cf In re Grand Jury Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 62-65 (3d Cir. 1982) (One
of the threshold questions in deciding whether there has been a breach of grand jury se
crecy is to decide if the information in question is in fact grand jury material. Grand jury
material has been defined as only that material which directly or indirectly reveals what
transpired before the grand jury. If material is obtained from an independent source, it is
not grand jury material under the Rule 6(e) definition.). See Calkins, supra note 29, stating:
In examining the evolution of grand jury secrecy, it is important to note that
the common-law concept of secrecy that was imparted to American jurisprudence
arose initially from a need to protect the grand jurors and private citizens from
the oppression of the state. It was not intended to aid the prosecution in its dis
covery of facts or to protect the prosecution's case from disclosure.
Id. at 458.
60. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 913 (1954); see also In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), where Justice Black stated in
dissent:
Secret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men every
where. They are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official power. They
are often the beginning of tyranny as well as indispensable instruments for its
survival. Modem as well as ancient history bears witness that both innocent and
guilty have been seized by officers of the state and whisked away for secret inter
rogation or worse until the groundwork has been securely laid for their inevitable
conviction. While the labels applied to this practice have frequently changed, the
central idea ... remains unchanging-extraction of "statements" by one means or
another from an individual by officers of the state while he is held incommuni
cado. . . . [I]t violates the Due Process Clause to compel a person to answer
questions at a secret interrogation where he is denied legal assistance and where
he is subject to the uncontrolled and invisible exercise of power by government
officials. Such procedures are a grave threat to the liberties of a free people.
Id. at 352-53 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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tion in conducting the investigation of the grand jury,61 with the ne
cessity of extending the secrecy requirement to the prosecutor. The
policy of government intrusion into the grand jury developed through
out the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such that today it is a mat
ter of right. 62 However, the prosecutor's access and use of grand jury
material is restricted by judicial supervision of the Executive's ac
tions. 63 "[G]overnment attorneys are allowed into grand jury rooms,
not for the general and multifarious purposes of the Department of
Justice, but because both the grand jury's functions and their own
prosecutorial duties require it."64 The grand jury remains an arm of
the judiciary, under its supervision, despite the necessary guidance of
the prosecutor.
Congress has also sought to "defend [grand jury secrecy] ...
against unwarranted intrusion."6s Rule 6(e), as originally enacted in
1946, limited use of grand jury materials to government attorneys in
the performance of their duties. The 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e),
which relaxed the restrictions on disclosure by government attorneys,
advanced the government's interest in criminal prosecutions and at
tempted to curb abuse by restricting automatic access to grand jury
materials and by imposing sanctions upon violators of grand jury
secrecy.

61. Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Grand Jury: Dismissal ofIndictments Pur
suant to the Federal Supervisory Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 133 (1987); see also In
re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971), which stated:
Over the years, as fear of the oppressive power of the government has sub
sided, the government prosecutor has regained substantive influence over the
grand jury and, consequently, that institution has lost much of its former inde
pendence. The grand jury now relies upon the prosecutor to initiate and prepare
criminal cases and investigations which come before it. The government attorney
is present while the jury hears testimony; he calls and questions the witnesses and
he draws the indictment. The only remnant of secrecy with respect to the govern
ment which adheres today is the practice of conducting the actual deliberations
and voting of the jury in private.
.
Id. at 569 (citation omitted). The modem grand jury has been criticized for its adherence
to secrecy. See generally Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51
A.B.A. J. 153 (1965); Calkins, supra note 29; Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical
Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807 (1972); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable
Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV. 668 (1962).
62. Calkins, supra note 29, at 458.
63. See infra notes 336-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inherent
supervisory powers of the judiciary over the grand jury.
64. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 429 (1983).
65. Id. at 425.
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6(e)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) has embodied the long
established rule of grand jury secrecy since 1946, when the criminal
rules of procedure for the federal courts went into effect. The rule, as
originally enacted, continued the common law practice in the federal
courts-"The policy of secrecy is traditional, and violation of the re
quired ... oath ... is both a contempt and acrlme at common law."66
Prior to the 1977 amendments, Rule 6(e) was amended in 1966 to ex
tend secrecy to the auxiliary personnel who recorded and transcribed
the testimony of witnesses. 67
A.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) in 1946

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1946,68
codified in Rule 6(e) the common law rule requiring secrecy of grand
jury proceedings. Rule 6 on the Grand Jury (originally Rule 7 in the
preliminary draft) did not change the traditional common law form of
the grand jury.69 However, the new rule enhanced the "effectiveness
of the grand jury by permitting greater flexibility in its use," particu
larly in the area of numbers of grand juries that can be summoned at
the same period of time and the length of service.70
Rule 6(e) dealt with the "frequently troublesome problem"71 of
66. Dession, The New Federal Rules 0/ Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J. 197,
203 n.97 (1941) [hereinafter Dession II].
67. See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 6(e)(I) and (2).
68. See Fed. R. Crim. P., 327 U.S. 821 (1946); see also Dession, The New Federal
Rules 0/ Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694 (1946) [hereinafter Dession I]; Dession
II, supra note 66; Orfield, The Federal Rules o/Criminal Procedure, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 543
(1945). In 1941, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee to draft the origi
nal Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court approved the draft rules in 1944 and
submitted them to Congress. The Rules took effect on March 21,1946. Dession I, supra, at
694-97. The Advisory Committee to the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
prepared at least ten drafts, "a laborious eight-year enterprise which required the participa
tion of ... judges, lawyers, government officers, legal scholars, and committees of bench
and bar." Id. at 694. The result of this work, where all those interested in criminal proce
dure could make known their needs, was a comprehensive code originating from every
known source. The rules which were confined to general principles embodied the following
objectives: promotion of simplification of procedure; improvement in objectively ascertain
ing the facts; more complete fulfillment of democratic values; and greater uniformity.
Orfield, supra, at 544.
69. Dession II, supra note 66, at 197 (The drafters could not change the requirement
for a grand jury in light of the Constitutional mandate for a grand jury for prosecution of
any felony.).
70. Id. at 198.
71. Id. at 203. The text of the original Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)
provided:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations
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the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. The secrecy provision es
sentially restated the traditional ~equirement of secrecy with two im
portant exceptions. The first exception was the provision for
disclosure. The rule continued the practice of allowing disclosure to
government attorneys to the extent that they are present in the room
when the evidence is presented. 72 Additionally, to save time and facil
itate proof, disclosure was permitted by the court when a defendant
made a good faith motion to dismiss an indictment. The second ex
ception was the provision that no obligation of secrecy could be im
posed on any person except in accordance with the rule. Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, witnesses took
the oath of secrecy, a restriction deemed "impractical and unfair."73
The original rule made no mention of sanctions for violations of the
rule.
Rule 6(e), as adopted in 1946, contained no provision for nonat
torneys assisting the government to access grand jury materials for
other purposes. The only provision relating to such activities stated:
"Disclosure ... may be made to ... the attorneys for the government
for use in the performance of their duties. "74 Despite this language
restricting access and use of grand jury materials. the Justice Depart
ment, faced with the reality of complex litigation, consulted a multi
tude of specialists. who in turn had to be apprised of what had
transpired before the grand jury. It became "common in some Disand the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise Ii juror, attorney, interpreter or
stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding
or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing
that.grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters
occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon
any persons except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an
indictment shaII be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail,
and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shaII disclose
the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execu
tion of a warrant or summons.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1946).
72. Orfield, supra note 68, at 549.
73. Dession II, supra note 66, at 204 (Witnesses should be able to make disclosures
to counsel to prevent unnecessary hardship.). See generally Brown, supra note 23 (The
trend toward imposing secrecy on witnesses before the grand jury, despite the general pro
hibition of the rule and the first amendment limitations of such an imposition, further
increases the prosecutor's control over the grand jury and increases the "sword" aspect of
the grand jury's work.).
74. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837 (1946). See supra note 71 for the text of
the original Rule 6(e).

1990]

FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e)

261

tricts for nonattorneys to be shown grand jury materials. "75 The 1977
amendments to Rule 6(e) addressed this problem..
B.

1977 Amendments to Rule 6(e)76

In the 1970's, regulatory agencies were referring economic viola
tions of their regulatory statutes to prosecutors for criminal proceed
ingS. 77 Courts struggled with this erosion of keeping the "sovereign"
out of the grand jury room. The first case that prompted statutory
consideration of the problem was In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons. 78
There, the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania de
nied the petitioner's motion for a protective order to prevent IRS ac
cess to materials the petitioner had given to the grand jury pursuant to
a subpoena. Although the IRS had access to the material while pro
viding technical assistance to the prosecutor, the information was not
requested in connection with a civil tax prosecution. The court would
not issue a protective order "so long as [the records] ... remain under
the aegis of attorneys for the government. "79
Five years later, the same court considered Robert Hawthorne,
Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue,8o where the plaintiff sought an
injunction to halt grand jury proceedings or an order restraining the
use of subpoenaed documents by the IRS. The plaintiff alleged that
the IRS had corporate records that had been given to the grand jury
and that the IRS agents had not been sworn to secrecy or advised that
the materials needed to remain under the "aegis" of the United States
Attorney. Although the plaintiff did not prevail, the court expressed
concern "as to the manner in which the Rule 6(e) orders were imple
mented in this case and apparently in general."81 Both parties relied
on Pflaumer as the sole authority. The court "suggested" the proper
procedures to be followed when agency personnel have access to grand
75. 463 U.S. at 436.
76. See supra note 4 for the text of Rule 6(e)(2), which was amended in 1966 to
include the operator of a recording device and any typist who transcribes recorded
testimony among those bound by secrecy, and for the text of Rule 6(e)(1), which was
amended in 1979 to require the recordation of all grand jury· prOceedings except
deliberations and voting.
77. See generally Hassett, Ex Parte Pre-Trial Discovery: The Real Vice of Parallel
Investigations, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049 (1979); Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 38;
Note, Federal Agency Access to Grand Jury Transcripts Under Rule 6(e), 80 MICH. L. REV.
1665 (1982).
78. 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7 n.lO,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 531.
79. 53 F.R.D. at 477.
80. 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
81. Id. at 1104.
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jury materials. 82 The Hawthorne court submitted this order,83 as well
as its Pflaumer decision, to the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 84
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a similar
problem in J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States,85 where the petitioner
challenged the use of grand jury materials by IRS agents who had
assisted the grand jury. Judge Hufstedler held that agency access to
grand jury materials must be restricted because the "grand jury is a
constitutional entity under court supervision, not a tool available for
Executive branch purposes."86 Judge Hufstedler recommended the
guidelines suggested by the Hawthorne court and added that the
"agency bears the burden of proving an independent source for the
information."87
While the courts were balancing the need for secrecy against the
government's need "to make use of outside expertise in complex litiga
tion,"88 the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Ju
dicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme Court began
to consider the problem of agency access to grand jury materials and
the resulting uncertainty from the judicial decisions. The amendment,
proposed by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules,89 reflected
82. Id. at 1125-27. The suggestions included: 1) All persons giving assistance should
be sworn to secrecy and written instructions should clarify the restricted use of the materi
als. 2) Grand jury materials must be segregated and marked as separate from agency files.
3) Before granting a request for specialized assistance there should be a strict showing of
necessity. 4) A detailed docket would keep track of the agency personnel with access to
what particular grand jury materials including dates when the agency was granted access.
83. Id. at 1126 n.54.
84. Id. at 1121.
85. 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9146, at 86,195 (9th Cir. 1976).
86. Id. at 86,197.
87. Id. at 86,199.
88. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, re
printed in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 527,529; HOUSE DOCUMENT, supra
note 7, at 8.
89. See 8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 6.01 [6] [b) (2d ed. 1990) for the
Proposed 1977 Amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provided:
6(e) SECRECY OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCLOSURE. Disclosure of matters occur
ring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror
may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of
their duties. For purposes of this subdivision, "attorneys for the government" in
cludes those enumerated in rule 54(c); it also includes such other government per
sonnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenogra
pher, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testi
mony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed
by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when
permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that
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the fact that government personnel assisted the JUstice Department in
grand jury proceedings because the increased volume and complexity
of litigation required increased specialization. 9O The Advisory Com
mittee Notes to the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) were submitted to
Congress on April 26, 1976 by the Supreme Court. 91 The proposed
changes continued to permit disclosure to government attorneys under
the original rule, but expanded the definition to include those individu
als defined by Rule 54(C).92 In addition to those individuals named in
Rule 54(c), the Advisory Committee included "such other government
personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in
the performance of their duties. "93 The final limitation "in perform
ance of their duties" was intended as a safeguard to protect against
unlawful disclosure and to further the policy of grand jury secrecy.
The Advisory Committee's proposed language for Rule 6(e) did pot
include sanctions for violations of the rule.
Because of time pressures, the three days of hearings before the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Ju
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters oc
curring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any
person except in accordance with this rule. The federal magistrate to whom an
indictment is returned may direct that it shall be kept secret until the defendant is
in custody or has been released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall seal the
indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when
necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
Id. (emphasis in original).
90. Walker, United States v. Sells: Engineering a Result to Promote Grand Jury Se
crecy, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99, 106 (1983).
91. The Senate Report to the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) stated:
The Supreme Court itself does not actually draft the proposed rule or amend
ment; that work is done by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. In the case of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that committee is
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules. The Advisory Committee's draft of
a proposed rule or amendment is reviewed by the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, which must give its approval to the draft. Any draft.
that it approves is forwarded to the Judicial Conference of the United States. If
the Judicial Conference approves the draft, it forwards the proposed rule or
amendment to the Supreme Court. The Judicial Conference's role in the
rulemaking process is defined by 28 U.S.c. 331.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 n.l, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 527, 528.
92. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(c) provides in part: "'[a]ttorney for the
government' means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General,
a United States Attorney, [or] an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 54(c).
93. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, re
printed in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 529; HOUSE DOCUMENT, supra
note 7, at 8 ("The phrase 'other government personnel' includes, but is not limited to,
employees of administrative agencies and government departments.").
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diciary were the only hearings conducted on these amendments by
Congress. Many who testified welcomed the substantive changes in
Rule 6 from "disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury ...
may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the per
formance of their duties" to an expanded definition of attorneys in
cluding "other government personnel as are necessary to assist the
attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties."
However, concerns were expressed at the hearings about the scope of
such changes and the possible effects on targets if grand jury informa
tion were made more widely available to government attorneys not
directly involved with the grand jury.94
The House was primarily concerned about access to materials by
personnel outside. the Department of Justice:
The substantive change to Rule 6(e) has been much criticized.
There was concern that it would pennit too broad an exception to
the rule of keeping grand jury proceedings secret. It was feared that
the proposed change would allow Government agency personnel to
obtain grand jury infonnation which they could later use in connec
tion with an unrelated civil or criminal case. This would enable
those agencies to circumvent statutes that specifically circumscribe
the investigative procedure otherwise available to them. 95

The House voted to disapprove the amendments because of the
inadequate protection against improper use by government personnel
not directly involved in the grand jury investigation. The House did
not submit alternative language.
The Senate Judiciary Committee redrafted the rule. 96 The Senate
Report favored the Supreme Court's proposal and found the Haw
thorne and Simp/ot decisions too "restrictive of the use of government
experts."91 The report specifically stated that the relaxation of restric
tions on secrecy of the government attorneys was:
necessary to facilitate the perfonnance of their duties relating to
criminal law enforcement. On the other hand, the Rule seeks to
allay the concerns of those who fear that such prosecutorial power
will lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce non-criminal Fed
94. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19-56,66-71,85-95, 105-06, 111-14, 147-81,204,229-30,246-47 (1977) [hereinaf
ter Hearings].
95. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2,5-8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 527, 528-32.
97. [d. at 7 n.lO, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 530-31.

1990]

FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e)

265

erallaws by (1) providing a clear prohibition, subject to the penalty
of contempt and (2) requiring that a court order under paragraph
(C) be obtained to authorize such a disclosure. 98

The concerns expressed reflected the balancing necessary to maintain
secrecy as government attorneys legitimately needed to make material
available to others in the government. The Senate version, which was
ultimately adopted without significant opposition, included a con
tempt provision for violations of Rule 6(e).99
The basic reason for expanding the scope of permissible disclo
sure was to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement. Secondary
reasons included providing certainty to attorneys seeking assistance in
grand jury investigations and encouraging efficient investigations with
out judicial delay. Although the amendment expanded the use of
grand jury materials by government personnel, it also sought to bal
ance such expansion with the express safeguard of contempt for viola~
tions found in Rule 6(e).100 The rule attempted to clarify who was
granted access to grand jury materials, but was unclear as to whether
criminal or civil contempt was envisioned as the sanction to guarantee
the necessary secrecy. To help clarify the nature of the contempt pro
vision expressly provided in Rule 6(e), a general examination of con
tempt as traditionally used by the courts is useful.

III.

CoNTEMPT OF COURT

Contempt of court is an act or omission obstructing or disrupting
the proper functioning of the judicial process. 101 The power to hold
an individual in contempt of court is the means by which the judicial
system protects itself from disorder in the courtroom, compels compli
ance with court orders, and protects litigants in an action before the
court. The power of contempt allows courts to protect "systemic val
ues by deterring official misconduct and preserving the appearance of
fairness,"102 while guaranteeing that prosecutors "act with due regard
98. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 531-32.
99. The amendments went into effect on October I, 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-78, 91
Stat. 319, 322 (1977). The Rule included the language" [a] knowing violation of Rule 6
may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
100. Id.
101. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 183, 185 (1971).
"Probably more common is the challenge presented to the administration ofjustice through
distortion or blocking of its processes obstruction rather than disruption. The distin
guishing characteristic of obstruction cases is that the contemptuous act tends to subvert
fairness or efficiency without the direct challenge of disruption." Id. at 189.
102. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1393-95 (9th Cir. 1983)
(Norris, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984). The dissent's main argu
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for the integrity of the administration of justice." 103 If courts were
unable to enforce their orders and control the proceedings before
them, they would be relegated to "mere boards of arbitration." 104
The contempt power is an inherent power, lOS largely judge
made,106 and necessary to the very existence of the court.107 It estab
lishes and maintains "civilized standards of procedure and evi
dence."108 As an independent branch of the government. the jUdiciary
has the powers necessary to function properly, including the power to
preserve the orderliness of the decision-making process and to enforce
decisions.109 However, legislation authorizes contempt in specific situ
ations,ll0 regulates the power, 111 and describes rules governing the
proceedings. 112 Occasionally legislation "allows" contempt as a way
ment was that a constitutional rationale was not the only way to dismiss an indictment and
that limiting the inquiry thus:
obscures the crucial analytical distinction between that rationale and an alternate
ground for dismissing an indictment: a court's exercise of its inherent supervisory
power.
. . . [W)hile a constitutional analysis focuses on preserving fairness for the
individual defendant . . . the exercise of a court's inherent supervisory power
serves two institutional purposes: deterring governmental misconduct and pro
tecting the integrity of the judicial" process.
Id. at 1394 (Norris, J., dissenting in part). See infra notes 336-49 for a discussion of the
inherent supervisory power of the judiciary over the grand jury.
103. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J.,
specially concurring).
104. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
105. Note, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's Erasure of the Blurred Distinction Be
tween Civil and Criminal Contempt, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 369 (1983).
106. Dobbs, supra note 101, at 185 n.3 ("There is an ancient statute that seems as
remote from the modern power of contempt in logic as it is in time. The Statute of West
minster II, 13 Edw. I, c. 39 (1285), provided that a sheriff might in some instances im
prison those who resisted his process. This resembles contempt power, but much as the
acorn resembles the oak: no one would ever have recognized the resemblance in
advance.").
107. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and
Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 679 (1981).
108. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
109. Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor
and the Grand Jury, 73 MICH. L. REV. 484, 496 (1975); see also Note, supra note 61, at 129
("The federal courts ... possess an inherent supervisory power that allows them to reach
beyond the Constitution or acts of Congress to establish and maintain civilized standards of
procedure and evidence." (footnote omitted»; Dobbs, supra note 101, at 184 ("The power
to preserve courtroom order is clearly essential. Unfortunately, it is easy to shade the need
for order into a requirement of dignity.... The power to enforce decrees, once made, is
likewise essential and important, though often enough this is done through execution of
sentence rather then through the contempt power.").
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
Ill. 18 U.S.C. §401 (1988).
112. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
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of enforcing behavior without delineating what type of contempt is
intended and what procedures govern the adjudication of any
process. 113
Similarly, Rule 6(e) does not indicate the nature of the contempt
for violations of grand jury secrecy. The Rule does not regulate con
tempt as other federal statutes dO,114 it merely authorizes its use for
specific misconduct. Examining contempt as it has evolved histori
cally, and as it has been codified in federal statutes, will assist in deter
mining the nature of the authorized contempt provision in Rule 6(e).
Additionally, understanding how civil and criminal contempts are ac
tually defined and used in the federal courts will help with the analysis
of the nature of the contempt under Rule 6(e).
A.

History of Contempt

Almost as old as the common law,11s "the massive power of con
tempt"116 grew up around the concept of contempt of the English
King's authority. 117 It was a way of assuring the dignity of and re
spect for the governing sovereign. The early common law deemed dis
obedience to the King's writ to be contempt and eventually the
defendant's failure to obey became contempt of the administration of
justice. I IS The American colonists' legal attitudes were largely a prod
113. See Hicks ex reL Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 n.4 (1988) (Civil and
criminal labels of law have become increasingly blurred in the codified laws of contempt.
For example, in California, civil and criminal contempts are defined in separate statutes,
but the procedural rules are the same for both.); see also LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689,
692-93,153 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1958) ("This power is essential to the existence and function
ing of our judicial system, and the legislature has no power to take away or materially
impair it.... However, the legislature may regulate the exercise of the inherent contempt
power by prescribing rules of practice and procedure."); Comment, Contempt of Court:
Some Considerations for Reform, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 1117, 1117 (1975) ("[M)ost statutes
merely recognize the contempt power; they do not define it.").
114. See in/ra notes 122-29 for a discussion of the federal statutes regulating
contempt.
115. Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEO. L.J.
1513, 1514 (1972) ("It is the antiquity of the contempt power which makes it nearly im
pregnable, but antiquity must not be confused with validity." (footnote omitted»; see also
R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 14-19 (1963) (History of English law indicates
that contempt power dates to the tenth century. There was no greater crime than contempt
because the King represented divine power and to disobey his representatives was to diso
bey him directly and, therefore, God.).
116. Dobbs, supra note 101, at 184.
117. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Contempt in
the Federal Courts. 17 F.R.D. 167, 167 (1955).
118. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 115, at 1-45, stating:
Justice was as strict as it was swift. In a case in 1631, a man threw a brickbat
at the Chief Justice after being convicted of a felony. Though he missed the
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uct of English law; it was natural that the contempt power was copied.
The JUdiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts "[the] power ... to
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all
contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same."119
The first challenge to the inherent power of an American court to pun
ish without due process came in 1826 when Judge James Peck dis
barred and punished an attorney who published an article critical of
judicial proceedings. 120 Although Judge Peck was impeached and
eventually acquitted, Congress enacted the Act of March 2, 1831 to
limit the court's contempt power to three categories of conduct: 1)
misbehavior "in the presence of the said court[], or so near thereto as
to obstruct the administration of justice"; 2) misbehavior of an officer
of the court in "official transactions"; and 3) disobedience or resistance
to a "lawful" court order.1 21
judge, his right hand was cut off and fixed to the gibbet, and he was immediately
hanged in the presence of the court.
Id. at 15; see also Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 167-68
(stating that while originally, "the contempt power was regarded as a means of vindicating
the court's authority," the concept of using it as a remedy for an adverse party gradually
evolved, and "this process has sometimes been accelerated by' restrictions of various sorts
placed upon criminal contempt proceedings"); Fink, Basic Issues in Civil Contempt, 8
N.M.L. REV. 55 (1978), stating:
Chancery did no more than to coerce the will of a disobedient party until such
time as he cooperated. The religious, moralistic atmosphere and the degree of
intimacy thus engendered between Chancellor and litigant with its emphasis on
duty, obedience and conscience underlies our Anglo-American belief in responsi
bility for contempt .... It explains how a purely private litigation between parties
. . . may become, as soon as an injunction issues, a matter personal to the court
To this double-edged nature of civil contempt must be added the "historical"
fact that civil contempt is not really contempt at all. Criminal contempt . . .
corresponds to ... the function of enforcing courtroom order. Historically, there
was a body of law labeled "contempt" and a distinct equitable procedural device
which was used to secure obedience to court orders, the so-called contempt in
procedure.
Id. at 56 (footnotes omitted).
119. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
120. Kuhns, supra note 109, at 486. See generally Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1376 (1990) (The Supreme Court held that a Florida statute was unconstitutional to the
extent that it prohibited disclosure of the reporter's own testimony after the tenn of the
grand jury had ended.); Dobbs, supra note 101, at 208-19 (summary of recent contempt
citations for criticism ofjudicial proceedings and the resulting tension of the constitutional
mandate in the first amendment for freedom of speech).
121. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1988»; see also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), stating:
Although it is true that the Act marks the first congressional step to curtail the
contempt powers of the federal courts, ihe important thing to note is that the area
of curtailment related not to punishment for disobedience of court orders but to
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This statute, as amended in 1970, continues to define the conduct
which constitutes contempt of court. Federal Rule of Criminal Proce
dure 42 governs the procedures for a contempt hearing. Because the
proceedings determine the rights afforded the contemnor, a brief ex
amination of the federal statutes is useful as these proceedings can also
be determinative of the nature of the contempt.

B.

The Federal Statutes and Rules

The basic statutory provision relating to contempt in the federal
courts is 18 U.S.C. section 401, entitled "Power of Court." 122 It con
tains substantially the same language as the Act of 1789.123 Section
402 of Title 18 requires that contempts involving wi11fu1 disobedience
punishment for conduct of the kind that had provoked Judge Peck's controversial
action.
Id. at 171; Kuhns, supra note 109, at 486 n.16; Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the
Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83, 86-87 (1947).
122. For a more complete discussion of the federal statutes governing contempt and
their possible application in the context of civil contempt, see infra notes 309-15. See also
United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Section 401 applies to both
criminal and civil contempt and contains no limitation on the power of the district court to
impose fine or imprisonment for a violation.").
123. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) provides:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
Id. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1988) provides:
Any person, corporation or association willfully disobeying any lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States
or any court of the District of Columbia, by doing any act or thing therein, or
thereby forbidden, if the act or thing so done be of such character as to constitute
also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under any laws of
any State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for such contempt
as provided in section 3691 of this title and shall be punished by fine or imprison
ment, or both.
Such fine shall be paid to the United States or to the complainant or other
party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may, where more than one
is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the court may direct,
but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the United States exceed, in case the
accused is a natural person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment ex
ceed the term of six months.
This section shall not be construed to relate to contempts committed in the
presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of jus
tice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prose
cuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States, but the same, and all
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of district court otders· which constitute a criminal offense be prose
cuted by a jury trial. Section 402 also provides that fines may be paid
either to the United States or to the complainant or other injured
party.124 This section specifically excludes direct contempts. All cases
of contempt "may be punished in conformity to the prevailing usages
at law."12S
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 126 deals with proceedings
to punish for criminal contempt. 127 There are two ways of proceeding
in criminal contempt cases: the summary hearing governed by Rule
42(a), triggered by an act committed in the presence of the judge, and
labeled a direct contempt; and a formal plenary hearing governed by
Rule 42(b), triggered by an act committed outside the presence of the
judge, initiated by a notice charging the individual with contempt of
court, and labeled an indirect contempt. 128 Although distinguishing
other cases of contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished
in conformity to the prevailing usages at law.
[d.

124. See also Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 170
("Section 402 ... recognizes ... the possibility of relief to the injured party in contempt
proceedings, and the structure of the statutes and rule ... clearly contemplates civil con
tempt proceedings. ").
125. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1988); see also supra note 123.
126. In the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
146-50 (1943), Rule 42 was Rule 34. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) provides
for Summary Disposition:
(A) SUMMARY DISPOsmON. A criminal contempt may be punished summa
rily if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the
contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The
order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and en
tered of record.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) provides:
(B) DISPOSITION UPON NOTICE AND HEARING. A criminal contempt ex
cept as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The
notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the crim
inal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by
the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the
United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose,
by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a
trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. The defendant is
entitled to admission to bail as provided by these rules. If the contempt charged
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from pre
siding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict
or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
127. But see United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980) (Although Rule
42 is labeled criminal, procedural safeguards apply to civil contempt.).
128. Dobbs, supra note WI, at 227-28 (The distinction between a direct contempt,
which is dealt with on the spot by the judge who witnessed the contempt, and an indirect
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between types of contempt on the basis of where the act occurs, the
rule does not define the nature of the contempt. "The rule does not
endeavor to define a criminal contempt or to distinguish it from a civil
contempt. To do this would constitute prescribing a rule of substan
tive law."129 Although the drafters did their best to require notice for
criminal contempts, meaningful distinctions between civil and crimi
nal contempt remained unclear in many cases.

c.

Criminal and Civil Contempt in the Federal Courts

The inherent judicial power to punish for contempt includes the
power to impose both civil and criminal penalties.l3° Judges, legisla
contempt, which requires a full hearing, is often a difficult line to draw.); see also Note,
supra note 105, at 374 (The direct/indirect distinction does not determine whether the
contempt is civil or criminal.). But see Kuhns, supra note 109, at 518.
In McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, Judge Learned Hand pointed out the diffi
culties in distinguishing between the two types of contempts and suggested that "some
simple and certain tests by which the character of the prosecution can be determined"
should be promulgated. 80 F.2d 211, 214, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603 (1935). Rule 42(b)
was in part a response to this need. Orfield, supra note 68, at 585. The requirement of
notice in Rule 42(b) will "result in an early decision on the complicated question of the
difference between a criminal and a civil contempt." Id.
129. Orfield, supra note 68, at 585; see also 18 U.S.C. § 402 ("[A]lI other cases of
contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished in conformity to the
prevailing usages at law."); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1558 n.17 (lIth Cir.
1988) ("If the contumacy is a crime in itself, the conduct is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 402 (1982). Because the disclosure of grand jury matters does not constitute a crime in
itself, that statute does not apply.").
130. Kuhns, supra note 109, at 496. See generally Fink, supra note 118, at 57-70,
where the author examines the development of contempt and the beginning of the dichot
omy between civil and criminal contempts. The distinction was finalized for purposes of
review in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The Court con
cluded that criminal safeguards were required in any adjudication of a criminal contempt
and absent such proceedings, the contempt had to be civil, allowing only civil-type penal
ties. The Court went further and stated that:
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often
serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the
punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for
criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority ofthe court.
Id. at 441. After Gompers, a judge was limited in using a contempt sanction: coercion
could only be used if there was something to coerce and criminal due process had to apply
to the adjudication of any procedure where any determinate sentence was handed down.
The problem with the punishment classification is that it does not inform the defendant at
the beginning of the action of the nature of the case against him. In United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258(1947), Justice Rutledge, in a biting dissent, criticized the
confusion created by the Supreme Court's lack of clarity:
This case is characteristic of the long existing confusion concerning con
tempts and the manner of their trial, among other things, in that most frequently
the question of the nature and character of the proceeding, whether civil or crimi
nal, is determined at its end in the stage of review rather than . . . at the begin
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tors, and commentators have been unable to give a precise definition of
the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt that avoids ana
lytic confusion. 131 However, there is general agreement in the federal
courts that the purposes served by each type of contempt are different
and that constitutional safeguards are required in any adjudication of
a criminal contempt.
1.

Civil Contempt

The primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce the individual
into compliance with a court order. 132 Civil contempt benefits the
other party in the proceeding, whose rights or remedies have been in
terfered with by the contemnor. Possible sanctions can include fines
and/or imprisonment that "encourage" the contemnor to cooperate
with the court. Such imprisonment and fines can continue indefinitely
since compliance is what the court requires from the contemnor. The
contemnor "carr[ies] the keys of ... [his] prison in ... [his] own
pockets,"133 indicating that a strong-willed perSon could be impris
oned indefinitely for civil contempt. 134 Civil contempts are initiated
by the offended party who petitions the court for relief. Civil con
tempt has been praised as the least drastic power to compel obedience
to a court order; however, this underestimates the sometimes drastic
results to an individual held in civil contempt. 13S
2.

Criminal Contempt

The primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish the con
temnor for disobedience. The conduct consists of violating a court
ning. And this fact in itself illustrates the complete jeopardy in which rights are
placed when the nature of the proceeding remains unknown and unascertainable
until the final action on review.
Id. at 368 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
131. Kuhns, supra note 109, stating:
Prior to the adoption of rule 42, courts tended to classify contempts as civil
or criminal according to such factors as the title of the proceeding, whether the
defendant testified, the nature of the relief sought or granted, and who conducted
the prosecution. The controlling factor would vary from case to case, and the
labeling might occur for the first time on appeal . . . .
Id. at 517-18 (footnotes omitted).
132. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
133. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
134. Brautigam, supra note 115, at 1523 n.61.
135. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 115, at 2-3 ("[I]t has been pointed out that the mag
nitude ofthe coercive penalty in civil contempts is measured by the resistance to be over
come rather than the gravity of what has been done. Though all societies punish people for
what they have done, only the common law punishes man 'in order to do violence to his
incoercible freedom to do or not to do something.' ").
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order or interfering with the orderly process of the court. 136 Criminal
contempt is not imposed for any private party's benefit because it is
imposed to vindicate the court's authority. It punishes acts in the past
rather that coerces any future act. "[I]f the defendant does that which
he has been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accom
plished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done
nor afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the
disobedience."137 Sanctions for criminal contempt are always punitive
and often confined within statutory limitations.
A recent Supreme Court case has attempted to clarify the distinc
tion. In Hicks ex rei. Feiock v. Feiock,138 the Supreme Court held that
the issue of whether the contempt proceeding and the subsequent relief
were civil or criminal raised a federal question under the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment because of the applicability of
constitutional protections in a criminal proceeding. The critical fea
tures which characterize one or the other contempt are "the substance
of the proceeding and the character of the relief that the proceeding
will afford."139 The purposes for which the relief is imposed "are
properly drawn from an examination of the character of the relief it
self."I40 Remedial relief imposed for an indefinite period of time is
civil and punitive relief which imposes a determinate sentence is crimi
nal. "These distinctions lead up to the fundamental proposition that
criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been
afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such crimi
136. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
137. Id.
138. 485 U.S. 624 (1988). In Feiock, a father was compelled by a California state
court to make support payments. Id. at 627. Upon his failure to pay, he was held in·
contempt of court, ordered to pay the support, spend 25 days in jail, and be on probation
for three years upon suspension of sentence. Id. at 628. The Court remanded the decision
for a determination of whether the contempt proceedings were civil or criminal, because
such a determination would be dispositive on the question of the validity of the presump
tion that an obligated parent is required to make support payments. Id. at 637-41. In a
criminal proceeding the presumption would violate due process, whereas in a civil proceed
ing the presumption would be constitutionally valid. The problem with the contempt sen
tence in Feiock was the uncertainty about the 25 days imprisonment. If the contemnor
violated the probation by not paying the support and consequently went to prison to serve
the 25 days, it is unclear if the sentence could be purged by paying the money during the 25
days, thus being released early. If that were the case, the contempt would be civil. If the
contemnor's violation during the probationary period resulted in 25 days imprisonment
regardless of payment during that time, the contempt would be criminal. Id. at 639-41.
139. Id. at 631; cf Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441 ("It is not the fact of punishment but
rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of
cases.") (emphasis added).
140. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 636.
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nal proceedings . . . . The Court has consistently applied these
principles."141
The Court in Feiock reiterated its view that the distinction be
tween civil and criminal contempt is an important one because it· de- .
termines what procedure governs the adjudication of the contempt.
"The United States Supreme Court has centered on the procedural
consequences of a criminal contempt citation; it has not directly con
cerned itself with a clarification of the differences between civil and
criminal contempt."142 The Supreme Court has recommended look
ing at what "the court primarily seek[s] to accomplish" as the best
approach. 143 If the goal is to benefit the other party to the action by
some act that the contemnor refuses to do, then the contempt is civil;
if the court wants to punish the contemnor for refusing to cooperate
with the court or for interfering with court procedures, then the con
tempt is criminal. However, in Feiock, the Court appeared to reject
the purposes distinction as dispositive. Although noting that "[t]he
proper classification of the relief imposed . . . is dispositive of this
case,"I44 the Court also pointed out that the purposes underlying the
proceeding were ambiguous. 14s
In the absence of ariy more explicit guidelines, courts have strug
gled with classifications and definitions of contempt to establish proce
dures and punishments for the various types of contempt. Since the
purpose of the proceeding is open to differing interpretations, and can
be ambiguous, as in Feiock, there exists confusion about what type of
contempt has been applied or should have been applied in a given situ
ation. 146 It would seem logical that the classification of the contempt
would also classify the conduct, but the procedures followed, the relief
granted, or the sentence imposed usually determines the nature of the
contempt. 147 The court's characterization of the contempt "is but one
factor to consider in determining the true character of contempt pro
ceedings."148 However, the way the court views the contempt deter
141. Id. at 632. "
142. Comment, supra note 113, at 1121.
143. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
144. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 637.
145. Id. at 638-39 ("[T]he proceeding may have been intended primarily to vindicate
the court's authority in the face of his defiance. On the other hand ... these charges were
part of an ongoing battle to force respondent to conform his conduct to the terms of those
orders, and of future orders as well.").
146. Comment, supra note 113, at 1119; see, e.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S.
61,64 (1939); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911); Bessette
v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328 (1904).
147. Dobbs, supra note 101, at 236; Martineau, supra note 107, at 681.
148. United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 1980).
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mines how the contempt is adjudicated and affects the contemnor's
rights throughout the proceedings. The importance of this last point
underscores the need for an early, accurate, and consistent determina
tion of the nature of the contempt.
To determine what type of contempt is being contemplated, the
reason -for its imposition must be determined. 149 This method of de
termining whether civil or criminal contempt is appropriate appears to
be backwards since the focus is not the conduct itself but the resulting
punishment. The contemnor can be "punished" before any determina
tion has been made of whether the contempt is criminal or civil. "To
state an act constitutes criminal contempt because criminal sanctions
are applied merely completes a tautology. This approach provides no
aid to analysis."lso If the type of contempt depends on the type of
sanction, the type of contempt cannot be determined until the conclu
sion of the proceeding and the procedure cannot be tailored to the type
of contempt, as yet undetermined. lSI A punitive sanction can only be
imposed after a proceeding meeting the constitutional safeguards nec
essary to a criminal proceeding. "Notwithstanding this principle, no
judicial opinion or statute has ever required the judge at the initiation
of contempt proceedings to determine the type of sanction that may be
imposed."IS2
Examining briefly the civil and criminal distinction outside the
area of contempt may help clarify the differences as they relate to the
constitutional requirements of the proceedings. ls3 "Parties to a civil
suit litigate in positions of reasonable equality. A criminal defendant,
on the other hand, stands against the prosecutorial powers of the gov
ernment and therefore criminal due process grants the defendant addi
tional protection to safeguard the balance of powers between the
149. Note, supra note lOS, at 375.
ISO. Comment, supra note 113, at 1120.
151. See supra note 130.
152. Martineau, supra note 107, at 684.
153. See Moskovitz, Contempt 0/ Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L.
REv. 780 (1943), stating:
[O]ne of the pervading principles of Anglo-American law is that a private plaintiff
may generally obtain only compensatory relief, while punishment is to be im
posed at the suit of the state. Thus, it is proper that civil or remedial contempt
proceedings be brought by private parties, while criminal or punitive proceedings
are to be brought by the state. The value of making the character of the party
plaintiff a test of the nature of the proceeding is enhanced by the fact that its
application is exceptionally easy, and also because it is available at the very begin
ning of litigation.
Id. at 787.
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parties." I S4 Traditionally contempt was viewed as sui generis I ss so
traditional concepts of criminal adjudication did not apply. Today,
however, in adjudication ofcriminal contempt, traditional due process
applies to the proceedings.
3.

Importance of the Distinction

The most important reason for determining whether a contempt
is criminal or civil is the fact that Constitutional procedural safeguards
are available to the contemnor in a criminal contempt. A contemnor
in a proceeding for criminal contempt is innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The contemnor has a right to call.wit
nesses and be able to prepare a defense. Additionally, he has the right
to a trial by jury if the ,sentence imposed can be longer than six
months.ls6 The imposition of a criminal contempt sanction (determi
nate sentence) after a civil proceeding will result in reversal on ap
peal. IS7 A civil proceeding does not require such elaborate due
process because the contemnor can cooperate at any time and the pun
ishment will cease. IS8
One of the secondary reasons for makin~ the distinction between
154. Comment, supra note 113, at 1120 (footnotes omitted).
155. Moskovitz, supra note 153, at 783 ("Proceedings for contempt of court are sui
generis. The label has'no value, save as a caveat. It warns us that precedents from other
fields of law will not solve the problems in this one, but the term does not itself furnish any
solutions." (footnote omitted)).
156. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
157. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local
Div. 689, 531 F.2d 617, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119,
125 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Brautigam, supra note 115, at 1535 n.155 ("The, high number
of reversals or reductions of sentences in contempt cases only confirms the view that justice
would be better served if imposition of punishment were less frequent.").
158. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 115, stating:
[A] different door is opened to a different legal arena and a new association of
participating procedures and characteristics. These classifications go to the heart
of an accused contemnor's liberty .... One turn, one move of position causes a
swirl of new and special legal relationships between government and the individ
ual. This aspect of the law of contempt is as reasonable as Russian roulette.
Often also the results are tragic.
To shrug this off as an unimportant procedural matter is to overlook the
crucial point. Because each determination of the classification of a contempt a
fortiori defines the treatment of the contemnor which will follow .... [C)riminal
contempts are pardonable, civil contempts are not; civil contempts allow for pun
ishment which could conceivably continue without end, while criminal contempts
have vaguely limited punishments; the privilege against self-incrimination and the
criminal Statute of Limitations apply. to criminal but not civil contempts; the bur
den of proving the offense is greater for criminal than for civil contempts; the civil
contempt sentence can be purged while an adjudication of criminal contempt is
fixed and final . . . . These are but a few of the more glaring examples, which
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criminal and civil contempt is the right of appeaL' 'Civil contempt is
considered interlocutory since it involves the original cause of action
and cannot be' appealed until there is a final judgment. A criminal
contempt proceeding is a separate cause of action with a final decree,
independent of the suit prompting the action, and is immediately
appealable. 1s9
4.

Blurring of the Dist4tctions

There exists considerable confusion about the boundaries of civil
and criminal contempt because certain conduct arguably constitutes
both civil and criminal contempt. The laws govenling contempt have
failed to clarify the distinctions and the labels used are not controlling
because "the " 'civil' and 'criminal' labels of the law have become in
creasingly blurred."I60
The Feiock court recognized that "both civil and criminal relief
have aspects that can be seen as either remedial or punitive or both:
when a court imposes fines and punishments on a cOntemnor, it is not
only vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial court order, but
it also is seeking to give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the
contemnor's behavior to conform to the terms required in the or
der."161 "Dleoretically, a criminal sentence satisfies the court's need to
maintain respect for its processes, while coercing compliance with its
decrees benefits other parties to the litigation. 162 A single proceeding
can accomplish both as long as constitutional safeguards are respected.
"[T]here is no theoretical barrier to the use of both civil and criminal
contempt powers simultaneously, though procedural demands may
put practical limits on such an operation."163
In Shillitani v. United States,l64 where a witness refused to testify
before a grand jury, the Supreme Court stated by way of dictum that
the "trial judge [must] first consider the feasibility of coercing testi
mony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge should reunderscore the perceptive Holmesian comment that the substance of the law is
secreted in the interstices of procedure.
Id. at 48-49 (footnote omitted).
159. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 171-72.
160. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988).
161. Id. at 635.
162. Dobbs, supra note WI, at 237.
163.. Id. at 237-38; see also United States v. Monteleone, 804·F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.
1986) (The defendant refused to answer questions ~fore a grand jury and was held in civil
contempt. He was subsequently convicted of criminal contempt for the same refusal.), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987).
164. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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sort to criminal sanctions only after he determines, for good reason,
that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." 165 InShillitani, the
Court concluded that the contempt was civil because the contemnors
were jailed until they agreed to go before the grand jury and testify.
The Court found that the sanctions were remedial.· "Courts often
speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment fOl: remedial pur
poses."166 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
expressed similar frustration in 1966:
The simple fact is that no one, simply no one, is able to determine
whether this was begun, tried, or ended as a case for criminal con
tempt, civil contempt, or both, or whether some place down the
trail, begun as one it was transmuted into the other. That is, of
course, one thing about which there may not be any doubt if a con- .
tempt order is to stand. 167

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Wendy,168 found that any contempt was improper, but
as imposed by the district court it was predgminantly civil, although
"[a]rguably, appellant was really cited for criminal contempt."169 The
defendant, an attorney, was held in contempt and fined five hundred
dollars per day by the judge for refusing to proceed with a trial as
ordered. The appellate court found that the appellant's ina~ility to
proceed with the criminal trial because the appellant was a tax attor
ney rather than a criminal attorney was a recognized defense to civil
contempt and, as such, was dispo.sitive of the classification because the
appellant was "obviously unqualified"170 to do what was being or
dered. His inability to do what was ordered militated against any con
tempt citation under the circumstances. 171
The appellate court in Wendy held that there was no viola~ion of
18 U.S.c. section 401, which governs criminal contempt. 'However,
the contemnor was unable to purge his contempt, a determining factor
in civil contempt. "The civil nature of the contempt is not turned
criminal by the court's efforts at vindicating its authority, an interest
which may be implicated in either civil or criminal proceedings. Thus,
165. Id. at 371 n.9.
166. Id. at 369.
167. Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1966).
168. 575 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1978).
169. Id. at 1029 n.13.
170. Id. at 1031.
17 L The court was sensitive to the consequences to an attorney of being cited for
contempt, either criminal or civil. "The appellation of 'civil' rather than 'criminal' con
tempt hardly alleviates the harm." Id. at 1030.
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we are giving principal weight to the punitive-remedial dichotomy."172
There is a presumption of finding civil as opposed to criminal con
tempt when there is some doubt about the contempt. 173 The Wendy
court looked at the contempt order and the defendant's response to
determine whether the contempt was civil or criminal.
The authority of the jUdiciary to punish for contempt is not ques
tioned under the courts' inherent supervisory power. Although guided
by the Executive branch, the judiciary enforces the orders of the grand
jury under statutory and due process limitations. However, even with
statutory authority, the judiciary must still make the initial and final
determinations of whether certain conduct is better dealt with under a
civil or criminal contempt. Clarity about the nature of the contempt
and the statutory basis of the proceeding simplifies the appellate pro
cess when contempt orders are challenged. In the absence of such
early judicial clarification, contempt proceedings can prejudice the
contemnor.

D. Judicial Control of the Grand Jury
The grand jury is organized by the court and its proceedings are
determined by statute. 174 The grand jurors, the United States Attor
ney, his or her assistants, the reporter of the grand jury proceedings,
the marshal and the bailiffs are considered officers of the court subject
to the control of the court for violations of their duties. 175 Although
grand juries do not operate independently of the court, courts should
not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason.176
In addition to sanctions for breaches of grand jury secrecy, courts
have the power to hold witnesses in contempt for a refusal to testify
and to purge the individual of contempt when the dignity of the court
has 'been restored. 177 The Supreme Court observed that "[a] grand
jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains
an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative func
172. Id. at 1029 n.13.
173. Id.
174. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
175. Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343,439 (1959).
176. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973); United States v. De Rosa,
783 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.) (The prosecutor may not interfere with the unbiased judg
ment of the grand jury.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); see also Lance v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Moreover, because the grand jury
process is now complete for Lance's case, there is no chance that any remedial relief
granted could interfere with the grand jury's work.").
177. In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 573 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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tion without the cOurt's aid."178 Consequently, courts use their inher
ent power of cont~mpt, a power necessary "to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings," 179 including the work of the grand jury.
Grand juries possess enormous power because of the "difficulty
and importance of·.their task,"180 and their powers ought to be super
vised and limited to the extent necessary to guarantee fairness. Be
cause secrecy is one basic ~ayto limit abuse of this power, inadvertent
or illegal breach of secrecy should be monitored by the court. Since
1977, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) has expressly provided
for punishment by ,contempt for violations of grand jury secrecy. Ac
cordingly, the federal courts have cited the express provision of con
tempt and other remedial sanctions to safeguard the necessary secrecy
of the proceedings: of the federal grand jury.
178. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). This case involved a witness
who refused to testify before a grand jury. Id. at 42. The initial refusal was not a contempt
of court. However, once the grand jury requested the judge's help to order the petitioner to
answer and he subsequently refused, he was guilty of a contempt. Id. at 42-43. At this
point Rule 42(b) would have been appropriate because the contempt was indirect. The
court ordered the petitioner to answer the questions in front of the judge who was then in
the grand jury room. The petitioner refused again and was summarily sentenced to fifteen
months imprisonment, imder Rule 42(a), for directly violating a court order. Id. at 44.
The Supreme Court upheld the sentence and the summary nature of the proceeding. Id. at
52. In his dissent, Chief Justice Warren remarked that principles offair play and the intent
of Rule 42 were violat~ by such a harsh summary punishment. Chief Justie;e Warren
stated tha~ Rule 42(a) was reserve<I for exceptional circumstances, not for the administra
tive' purpOse of maldng contempts easier to prosecute. This was the longest sentence ever
sustained on appeal for a refusal to answer questions before a grand jury. Id. at 58-59
(Warren, C.J., dissenting).
179. Ex parte Terry, 128.U.S. 289, 303 (1888) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 50S, 510 (1873». See infra notes 336-49 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts.
180. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 434 (1983); see also' In re'Grand
Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1985), which stated: ~
The grand jury is, to a degree, an entity independent of the courts, and both
the authority and the obligation of the courts to control its processes are limited.
Frequent or undue court intervention in the proceedings of a grand jury would
Impede its authority and make it a less efficacious instrument for the administra
tion of the criminal laws. The need to preserve the secrecy of an ongoing grand
jury investigation is of paramount importance, and the judiciary must respect the
autonomy of the grand jury proceedings in this regard. . . .
The rule of judicial noninterference with grand jury proceedings is not abso
lute. A court may exercise supervisory authority over the grand jury proceedings
if there is a clear basis in law and fact for so doing.... Courts may also exercise
supervisory power,over the grand jury where there is a clear potential for a viola
tion of the rights either of a witness or of a non witness, if the violation Cannot be
corrected at a later stage.
Id. at 864 (citations omitted).
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VIOLATIONS

Prior to 1977, federal courts used their inherent supervisory pow
ers to sanction individuals who violated the secrecy provisions of Rule
6(e). Many of the cases involved motions by defendants to dismiss
indictments or quash subpoenas. Rarely did the' defendant request
sanctions in the form of contempt of court, although the courts regu
larly recognized contempt as an appropriate remedy for violations of
Rule 6(e). After the adoption of the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e)
expressly authorizing contempt, the federal courts have continued to
recognize the appropriateness of contempt and other remedies such as
suppression of testimony, dismissal of indictments and convictions,
and quashing of subpoenas. The following sections divide the cases of
Rule 6(e) violations chronologically into the cases before the 1977
amendments and the cases after the adoption of the express contempt
provision, with particular emphasis on Lance v. United States Depart
ment ofJustice,l8l which established standards for determining what is
sufficient for a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation.
A.

Cases Prior to 1977

Many of the cases prior to the 1977 amendments reveal a reluc
tance on the part of the courts to remedy prosecutorial abuse of the
grand jury. Secrecy has largely shielded the actions of the prosecutor,
who exercises substantial control over the grandjury.1B2 However, the
early cases do underscore the jUdiciary;s respect for grand jury secrecy
in general, and its willingness to impose sanctions on violators other
than government attorneys.
In re Summerhayes,183 decided in 1895 by the District Court of
the Northern District of California, involved disclosures by a grand
juror, who violated the oath of secrecy. The court proceeded under
section 725 of the Revised Statutes that allowed courts to use their
authority to prevent obstruction of justice. l84 The district court's
opinion, holding the grand juror in contempt of court, illustrated the
importance with which the courts treated such violations of their or
ders and inattention to the secrecy oath. "I think it is a serious of
181.

610 F.2d 202, 216-20 (5th Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
183. 70 F. 769 (N.D. Cal. 1895); see also Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516
(9th Cir. 1939) (A grand jury witness refused to take the oath of secrecy and was punisbed
with a thirty-day determinate sentence of imprisonment. There was no discussion of coer
cion and subsequent purging by the punisbment which would have implicated a civil
sanction.).
184. 70 F. at 773.
182.
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fense. I think it is one of the gravest offenses that has been committed
in this district against the regular and proper administration of the
law. The respondent must be punished, and I think he ought to be
punished severely."lss Consistent with the traditional purposes of
criminal contempt, the criminal contempt in Summerhayes was im
posed to vindicate the court's authority.
In Schmidt v. United States,186 the United States Court of Ap
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court
and remanded the case before another judge to ensure fairness 1s7 and
to determine whether the conduct of the appellants was merely techni
cal contempt or involved willful and intentional disrespect· of the
court. ISS The appellants were attorneys who had advised their clients
that they had the right to question grand jurors about the indictment
that had been returned against them. The district court found that,
although claiming to act in good faith, such conduct was an obstruc
tion of justice and, therefore, the attorneys were guilty of criminal .
contempt. 189
The court stated the traditional rules for secrecy of the grand jury
and indicated that only one of these reasons was to protect the inno
cent against unjust accusations. l90 The other reasons of promoting
freedom of the investigation and untrammeled disclosures, and
185. Id. at 775.
186. 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940).
187. Id. at 398; cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) ("If the contempt charged involves disre
spect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or
hearing except with the defendant's consent.").
188. liS F.2d at 398. This case involved a petition against alleged contemnors to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for violations of grand jury
secrecy. After being judged guilty of contempt, they appealed their convictions. The ap
pellate court viewed the contemnors conduct as an "unlawful interference with ,the pro
ceedings of the court," but stated that their actions may only have involved a teChniCal
contempt. Id. at 396. On remand, the court sought a distinction between a technical con
tempt and a contempt involving willful and intentional disrespect for the court. ,"Such
decision is required as a prerequisite to a proper determination of the penalty to be im
posed." Id. at 398..
In Schmidt, the court found the punishment for contempt necessary to vindicate the
court's authority, a purpose consistent with a finding of criminal contempt. However, the
court's remand to determine the contemnor's state of mind appeared to necessitate further
inquiry into a finding of criminal contempt or civil contempt. Nonetheless, the facts did
not support the usefulness of a coercive sanction. Perhaps the reference to a technical
contempt was to mitigate the harshness of any punishment for the contempt, rather than to
clarify the underlying purpose or nature of the contempt. The current language of Rule
6(e) requires a "knowing" violation which would seem to negate any contempt where the
alleged contemnor acted in good faith consistent with past practices and cases. .See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
189. Id. at 396.
190. Id. at 396-97.
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preventing perjury and flight of the target, were for the protection of
the grand jury itself which is a representative of the public. The court
did mention that protecting the innocent was traditionally respected,
but implied that the other reasons, which protect the grand jury itself
as an independent representative of the people, are more important.
The court reiterated the view that private attorneys do not decide
when secrecy can be relaxed, because "[l]ogically, the responsibility
for relaxing .the rule of secrecy and of supervising any subsequent in
quiry should reside in the court.... "191
In United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 192 the District Court
for Rhode Island denied the newspaper's motion to dismiss an infor
mation charging it with contempt of court for publishing the names of
four prominent doctors testifying before a grand jury which was inves
tigating illegal cocaine traffic. The court found that conspicuous pub
lication of the identity of witnesses frustrated the purposes of s~recy:
Publicity may defeat justice by warning offenders to escape, to de
stroy evidence, or to tamper with witnesses....
. . . Even when it does not lead to the flight of an offender, it
may result . . . in a failure of the grand jury to secure evidence
sufficient for an indictment.
Secrecy is also required in order that the reputations of inno
cent persons may not suffer from the fact that their conduct is under
investigation ....
. . . Furthermore, such premature reports may go further and
prejudice the mind of the public, thus affecting a trial which may
follow the action of the grand jury. 193

The newspaper gave no account of matters occurring before the
grand jury. It merely observed who entered the grand jury room and
published enough facts in the newspaper for the reading public to
draw accurate inferences. The court found that even though not
sworn to secrecy, the newspaper, as any citizen, had the duty to "as
sist, and not to frustrate, the work of the administration of justice." 194
These early cases illustrate the importance with which the judici
ary viewed grand jury secrecy, and the willingness of the jUdiciary to
191. Id. at 397.
192. 241 F. 524 (D.R.1. 1917); see also United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283,
302-09 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (The court addressed the role of the grand jury and the press,
finding that unauthorized disclosure by government attorneys was reprehensible, but not
prejudicial.).
193. 241 F. at 526.
194. See id. at 528.

284

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:245

exert control by use of the contempt power when breaches of secrecy
occurred. However, the reasoning fails to illuminate the need or the
efficacy of remedies against government attorneys involved in breaches
of secrecy. All of these cases contemplated criminal contempt against
jurors, defense attorneys, and newspapers involved in "leaking" infor
mation to the public. None of the cases compelled the court to discuss
sanctions against government attorneys for secrecy violations.
Although the facts in the Tribune case were somewhat similar to mod
em cases of "leaks" to the newspaper, the reasoning which found a
citizen's duty not to frustrate justice may fail when applied to the gov
ernment. Arguably, the contempt in the Schmidt case could be con
strued as civil because the judge found no willful state of mind. Such
reasoning opens up the possibility of civil as well as criminal contempt.
However, further analysis would show that in this factual situation,
vindication of the court's authority would be the only purpose served
by the imposition of any contempt.
Many of the more recent pre-1977 cases involved a motion by the
defendant to dismiss the indictment, not a motion to seek sanctions
against the government officials allegedly violating Rule 6(e)'s secrecy
provision. 195 In In re the Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Pedro
Archuleta,196 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
refused the requested relief of quashing the subpoena,197 upon grounds
of lack of good faith in calling the defendant as a witness, illegal wire
195. See United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., 475 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir.)
(The court refused to set aside convictions based on alleged grand jury violations, including
violations of Rule 6(e). However, the court pointed out that the appropriate remedy would
be a contempt citation to stop grand jury abuse and protect secrecy.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
832 (1973); United States v. Kearney, 436 F. Supp. 1108, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("More
over, it would appear that the appropriate remedy for improper disclosure of grand jury
evidence is contempt and not dismissal of the indictment."); United States v. Mitchell, 372
F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Each of the defendants sought dismissal of the indictment because of preindict
ment publicity in contravention of Rule 6(e). In each case, the district court found no
grounds to warrant an evidentiary hearing and also did not discuss the use of lesser sanc
tions than the drastic step of dismissing an indictment.); United States v. Archer, 355 F.
Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) (proving that preindictment pUblicity prejudiced the
grand jury is probably unmanageable); United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963).
196. 432 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. N.Y.), reconsidered on subsequent motion, 434 F. Supp.
325 (S.D.N.Y.1977). In a subsequent case, In re the Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon
Pedro Archuleta, 561 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1977), Archuleta was found guilty of civil con
tempt for refusing to answer questions put to him before the grand jury.
197. See also United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). The court
quashed the subpoena and strongly condemned the practice of releasing prejudicial infor
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tapping, ethnic composition of the grand jury, and illegal disclosure of
grand jury information to the New York Times. The district court
acknowledged the harm to defendant's reputation and standing in the
community,198 and suggested that the proper remedy was the imposi
tion of sanctions upon the offending party.199
In Archuleta, the grand jury was investigating allegations of in
volvement in a New York City bombing incident. Archuleta was al
legedly a supplier of dynamite to a Puerto Rican independence group.
The court did not think it sufficient to rest on "mere exhortations and
condemnatory words: 'the mere gnashing of judicial teeth should not
remain the sole response to such law enforcement behavior.' "200 The
court recognized that leaks from the government were "a betrayal of
the grand jury's historic role as a shield for innocent citizens from
unwarranted charges of wrongdoing. "201 The court was unable to de
termine the identity of the source of the leaks to the press,2°2 however,
the district court directed the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York to conduct an internal investigation and report
back to the court within thirty days. 203 The district court assumed
that the Department of Justice would investigate the disclosures. No
sanctions were ever imposed. 204
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
mation about a grand jury witness, holding that such violations of Rule 6(e) would not be
tolerated:
Visiting opprobrium on persons by officially charging them with crimes while
denying them a forum to vindicate their names, undertaken as extra-judicial pun
ishment or to chill their expressions and associations, is not a governmental inter
est that we can accept or consider. It would circumvent the adversary process
which is at the heart of our criminal justice system and of the relation between
government and citizen under our constitutional system. It would be intolerable
to·our society.
Id. at 806 (footnote omitted).
198. 432 F. Supp. at 598.
199. Id. at 599.
200. Id. (quoting United States v. Capra, 372 F. Supp. 609, 615 (1974».
201. Id. at 598.
202. Id. at 599 ("[11he government is not in a position to deny that some of that
information may have come from federal sources somewhere in the United States."). .
203. Id.
204. 561 F.2d 1059, 1063 n.8; cf United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d eir.
1972) (An indictment was dismissed because the prosecutor failed to heed warnings against
using hearsay before the grand jury.). Although Estepa was not a case where Rule 6(e) was
implicated, it does demonstrate the court's willingness prior to 1977 to use supervisory
. powers to ensure the fairness of the grand jury system. The court's acknowledgment that
injunctive relief in the form of requesting that the prosecutor cease his use of hearsay was
ineffective. The court did not use contempt sanctions to ensure the fairness, but dismissed
the indictment, an extreme sanction.
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Circuit upheld the conviction for civil contempt for Archuleta's re
fusal to answer questions before the grand jury because the "govern
ment has supplied affidavits denying that any breach of grand jury
secrecy was the basis for any of the articles mentioned."20s The court
stated that "[i]f such violations do occur, the district court has ade
quate powers to remedy the situation. "206
The attitudes expressed by the appellate court in Archuleta under
score the need for more careful analysis of the problem of what is
necessary for a prima facie showing of a grand jury secrecy violation.
Such clarity may have been useful to Archuleta considering that the
court found affidavits merely denying breaches of secrecy sufficient to
deny any relief. Although the district court attempted to remedy the
abuse, its efforts were ineffectual. Given the reluctance to dismiss in
dictments and the willingness to hold nongovernment violators of
grand jury secrecy in criminal contempt, the adoption of the express
sanction may have influenced the courts to examine the government's
conduct. An examination of the cases after the 1977 amendment will
assist in any determination of whether the Judiciary has become more
willing to use its express grant of authority to sanction the government
attorneys for breaches of secrecy.
B.

Cases After the 1977 Amendments to Rule 6(e)
Contempt of court has been more readily acknowledged 207 as the

205. 561 F.2d at 1064.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Malatesta, 5i13 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In the
usual case Rule 6(e) may be adequately enforced by a contempt citation ...."); United
States v. Kouba, 632 1". Supp. 937 (D.N.D. 1986) (The court found that the defendant's
claim of violations of Rule 6(e) lacked substance and that dismissal of the indictment was
not warranted absent a showing of prejudice because the rule provided for sanctions.). In
United States v. Barker, 623 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1985), six defendants were charged
with violations of federal narcotic laws. The motion to dismiss the indictment, subse
quently denied, was based on an allegation of breach of grand jury secrecy. The court's
holding that there was no violation of the rule turned on the definition of "government
personnel" within the meaning of the rule. Dismissal of the indictment is only warranted
where there is "a showing that there was such an abuse of the grand jury process that any
substantial rights of the defendant were impaired or the integrity of the grand jury proceed
ings was impugned." Id. at 840 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1044 (5th
Cir. 1981». In the absence of any such showing the rule is enforced by sanctions specifi
cally provided in the Rule. In Donovan v. Smith, 552 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the
defendants alleged that the charges of breaches of fiduciary duty under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act were the product of a violation of grand jury secrecy. To
prove the allegation, the defendants had deposed various people employed in the United
States Department of Labor and the United 'States Department of Justice Strike Force.
The government moved for a protective order to prevent the deposition of the lead attorney
in the Labor Department. The attorney had already testified in camera and the court was
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appropriate sanction for violations of grand jury secrecy since its in
clusion in Rule 6(e). Most courts, however, do not see it as the exclu
sive remedy for violations of grand jury secrecy and recognize not only
criminal contempt and civil contempt, but also injunctive relief,208
when considering whether the exercise of supervisory power is war
ranted for breaches of secrecy in grand jury proceedings.
, In United States v. Myers,209 the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York refused to dismiss indictments, holding that dis
missal was an inappropriate sanction for violations of Rule 6(e).210
The targets alleged leaks to the news media concerning their alleged
involvement in the Abscam investigations by the grand jury. The
court acknowledged that the government's conduct was grossly im
proper, and possibly illegal, and that it could properly exercise its su
pervisory power to deter prosecutorial misconduct. However, the
court found that "this authority must be invoked with extreme caution
and in the exceptional case."211 The court found its supervisory power
limited "to achieve one or both of two objectives: first, to eliminate
prejudice to a defendant in a criminal prosecution; second, to help to
satisfied from this testimony that no breach of secrecy had occurred. The court stated that
contempt or a motion to suppress was an appropriate remedy. In United States v. Gregory,
508 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Ala. 1980), the judge refused to recuse himself after tendering a
financial disclosure statement and remarking to the defense counsel, "I hope you choke on
it." Id. at 1219. In support of the request for recusal, the defendants had accused the judge
of ignoring contemptuous behavior of tl).e government prosecutor. The judge stated that
the defendant must initiate a motion for contempt in any allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct.
208. See. e.g., United States v. DiBona, 601 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1984). In
DiBona, injunctive relief was granted where the defendants had entered guilty pleas in a
criminal action for filing false statements with the United States government. In the subse
quent civil action for filing false claims for payment of defense contracts for work that was
not performed, the defendants alleged that the government used grand jury material in
contravention of Rule 6(e). The court found no violation of Rule 6(e), however, it issued
an order enjoining the government from any further use of the material.
209. 510 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
210. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988) (The government
repeatedly violated Rule 6(e); however, such problems cannot result in dismissal of an in
dictment after convjction absent any effect on the outcome at trial.). In Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a district court
may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings absent prejudice to the
defendants. However, Justice Marshall in dissent stated that:
Because of the strict protection of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, instances
of prosecutorial misconduct rarely come to light.... The fact that a prosecutor
knows that a Rule 6 violation is unlikely to be discovered gives the Rule little
enough bite.... Today's decision reduces/Rule 6 to little more than a code of
honor that prosecutors can violate with virtual impunity.
Id. at 264-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. 510 F. Supp. at 328.
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translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent
performances by their assistants."212 The court listed other lesser
sanctions to det~r future misconduct of government attorneys, includ
ing the contempt sanctions of Rule 6(e).213 The court found such rem
edies sufficient to deter future misconduct and noted that supervisory
powers needed to be exercised with restraint. 214
The contempt sanction in Rule 6(e) is not considered the exclu
sive remedy for violations of grand jury secrecy. 21 S In United States v.
Coughlan,216 the defendant claimed that a civil complaint which at
tached four pages from defendant's grand jury testimony in a criminal
indictment violated Rule 6(e). The defendant wanted to suppress the
testimony from the criminal indictment.
Although the government admitted the violations of Rule 6(e), it
contended that sanctions for contempt were the appropriate remedy,
not suppression of the evidence. The court stated that the language in
212. Id. (quoting United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 1978), cerL
denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979».
213. Id. Although using the word "guilty" in describing the potential contemnor,
the court cited Lance v. United States Department of Justice, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980),
as authority for the use of Rule 6(e), which applied civil sanctions. See infra notes 224-41
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lance case. See also United States v. Ander
son, 778 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1985), where the court refused to use the "drastic action" of
dismissal for alleged violations of Rule 6(e). The court did not mention other lesser sanc
tions, but implied that dismissal was not the usual way to proceed when' prosecutorial
misconduct is found under Rule 6(e). "Reported cases where an appellate court has upheld
a district court's dismissal of an indictment because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct are
few and far between." Id. at 606. In In re Harrisburg Grand Jury-83-2, 638 F. Supp. 43
(M.D. Pa. 1986), the Department of Justice asked for a prospective determination of
whether certain conduct that complied with a subpoena duces tecum would violate Rule
6(e). The court acknowledged the Lance opinion and the fact that an individual may peti
tion the government for contempt sanctions, although no such petition was filed in the
instant case. Id. at 50 n.8.
These cases, where the trial court did not dismiss the indictment or the appellate court
did not uphold the dismissal of the indictment, imply that lesser sanctions are useful and
adequate to uphold the public interest in a fair system, while at the same time protecting
the public interest in law enforcement.
214. 510 F. Supp. at 329.
215. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), which stated:
Errors of the kind alleged in these cases can be remedied adequately by
means other than dismissal. For example, a knowing violation of Rule 6(e) may
be punished as a contempt of court. . . . [T]he court may direct a prosecutor to
show cause why he should not be disciplined and request the bar or the Depart
ment of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The court may
also chastise the prosecutor in a published opinion. Such remedies allow the
court to focus on the culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the
unprejUdiced defendant.
Id. at 263.
216. 842 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Rule 6(e)(2) was not exclusive, because "may be punished" was per
missive language. The court held that suppression of the testimony
might be a more appropriate remedy than contempt. The court's ac
knowledgment that "[slome Rule 6 violations are correctable"217 im
plies that injunctive relief which prevents further damage is allowable
under the rule. In this case, the damage had already been done to the
defendant and he could not be protected, however, judicial action was
necessary to "protect the integrity of the grand jury system."218 The
court of appeals directed the district court on remand to determine
whether particularized need,219 which would be dispositive on the is
sue of suppression, justified disclosure of the grand jury testimony to
another grand jury. The district court was also instructed to consider
other remedies, including contempt, for the admitted violations of
Rule 6(e).220
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit de
nied relief in the form of terminating the grand jury proceeding in
Scott v. United States. 221 The appellant's allegations that the govern
ment had made unauthorized disclosures that were the source of news
stories about William J. Scott, the Attorney General of Illinois, were
found insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Although the
court was "satisfied that a denial of review at this time would deprive
Scott of a meaningful opportunity to air his grievance before an appel
late court,"222 the court found that denial of a hearing was proper
because of the "weak basis"223 of Scott's allegations. The appellate
court affirmed the district court's finding that the news media reports
attributing their information to government sources were too vague to
merit an evidentiary hearing.
The lack of clarity in the Scott case about what was necessary for
Id. at 740.
218. Id.
219. The Supreme Court has consistently construed Rule 6(e) as requiring particu
larized need before permitting disclosure. See United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S.
418 (1983), where the Court restated:
Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show ... that the
need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy . . ..
. . . [T]be need for it [must] outweigh the public interest in secrecy .... [T]he
court's duty ... is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the rele
vant circumstances and the standards announced by this Court.
Id. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979)
(citations omitted».
220. 842 F.2d at 740.
221. 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978).
222. Id. at 891.
223. Id. at 893.
217.
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a prima facie finding for sanctions in a news leak case was addressed
with specificity in Lance v. United States Department of Justice,224
where the court held that a prima facie showing for sanctions did not
require as strong a showing as one where the indictment will be dis
missed. Additionally, the Lance opinion was the first to recognize a
private right of action allowing a target to invoke the civil contempt
power of the court for alleged violations of Rule 6(e).
C.. Lance v. United States Department of Justice 22S

In 1977, a federal grand jury began investigating banking prac
tices in Georgia. Bert Lance, a close friend of President Carter and
former Director of the Budget, was one of the individuals being inves
tigated because of his involvement with the National Bank of Georgia.
Nationwide attention was focused on the investigation through articles
in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal.
In Lance, the target's motion requesting sanctions against the
government for alleged leaks to the press226 of a grand jury investiga
tion was denied after two previous attempts at prohibition of all extra
judicial pUblicity had been denied. Finally, Lance requested that the
court order the attorneys for the government to show cause why they
should not be sanctioned for unlawful disclosure of matters before the
grand jury. Lance alleged that the news leaks, which were a violation
of Rule 6(e), infringed his right to a fair and impartial trial. In re
sponse to his motion, the district court found that Lance had failed to
present sufficient evidence of governmental misconduct. 227
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir
cuit concluded that the remedy requested by the target was. civil con
tempt. 228 The' court reasoned that the primary purpose of the
proceeding was remedial, which was the controlling factor in charac
terizing the contempt. The court emphasized that the harm alleged by
Lance was repeatable, and, as such, waiting until the final judgment of
a criminal trial would be an ineffective remedy. "Acquittal or convic
tion would so obscure the claim of a personal remedy for grand jury
224. 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 207-12 nn.I-3.
227. Id. at 207-12.
228. See Moskovitz, supra note 153, at 790 ("The prayer for relief ... has intrinsic
significance in deciding the question of civil versus criminal contempt because it is a direct
and conscious statement by the plaintiff of his purpose in bringing the action. ").
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irregularity as to render it meaningless."229 Because the indictment
had been returned against Lance, any remedial efforts at this point
would not have interfered with the grand jury's deliberations.
The Lance opinion analyzed what was required for a prima facie
showing of a violation of Rule 6(e). First, there had to be a clear indi
cation that the media reports disclosed "matters occurring before the
grandjury."23o Second, the articles had to indiCate the source ofinfor
mation as one proscribed by the rule. 231 Third, the judge should as
sume that all statements in the news were correct. 232 Fourth, the trial
judge had to consider the nature of the relief requested and the extent
to which it would interfere with the grand jury process. 233 Finally, the
trial court had to consider any evidence presented by the government
to rebut the assumed truthfulness of the reports. 234
Applying these factors in Lance, the majority concluded that
"matters occurring before the grand jury" included disclosure of any
thing· "tend[ing] to reveal what transpired before the grand jury. "235
The court found that the articles contained "numerous disclosures of
information about the grand jury proceedings, "236 and that the articles
either expressly or inferentially identified government attorneys as the
source of the information. The third factor, which required the judge
to assume the truth of the articles, was considered plausible because
secrecy prevented Lance from gaining access to testimony before the
grand jury. The government was in the best position to know if the
articles contained grand jury information and whether there was a vio
lation of Rule 6(e). Because the indictment had been returned against
Lance, the effect on the grand jury was a moot point. Finally, the
court found the government's denial inadequate because the defend
ants in the cases cited by the government's affidavit failed to ask for
injunctive relief. 237
The court held that Rule 6(e) expressly authorized the imposition
of sanctions, and that granting the relief sought by Lance in this case
would not have interfered with the grand jury's investigation. The
.court did not discuss the possibility that criminal contempt was the
229.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

610 F.2d at 213.
at 216.
at 217.
at 219.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 219-2l.
at 216 (quoting United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 458 F. Supp. 784, 790
(W.D. Mo. 1978».
236. Id. at 220.
237. Id. at 213-220.
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exclusive remedy enVisioned by Congress in 1977. Additionally, the
court did not discuss the related question of whether a target has
standing to invoke the contempt powers of the court for alleged viola
tions of grand jury secrecy. 238 The court merely concluded that Lance
had such standing based on the remedial purposes of civil contempt.
The dissent stated that the contempt in Rule 6(e)(2) is criminal
and any denial of the motion for sanctions is not appealable, whereas
the alleged contemnor can appeal without waiting for any final deci
sion on the merits of the case in chief.239 The distinguishing charac
teristics of criminal or civil contempt include the character of the
offense and whether the purpose of the sanction vindicates the public
interest (criminal contempt) or remedies a wrong to a particular per
son (civil contempt). Additionally, it must be determined if the rem
edy prayed for results in punitive sanctions, such as unconditional
fines or imprisonment, or the remedy results in compensatory or coer
cive, sanctions to secure performance of the obligation, making it a
civil sanction. 240
The Lance court provided useful guidelines to the lower courts
when they are faced with the problem of the sufficiency of a prima
facie showing of violations of grand jury secrecy in cases involving
preindictment pUblicity. However, it did not analyze the relative
weight to be given each of the findings nor set forth the procedures to
be followed once a prima facie showing is established. Additionally,
the Lance majority did not address the question of whether criminal
contempt would have been more effective in punishing prosecutorial
misconduct or deterring future violations. 241
238. Cf Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979). InDouglas
Oil, the Court held that the target of a grand jury investigation had standing to object to the
release of grand jury transcripts. The target had an interest "legally protected under the
Court's rulings concerning grand jury secrecy. One of the several interests ... is the pro
tection of the innocent .... " Id. at 218 n.8. In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978,
581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978),the court denied a motion to quash grand jury subpoenas
and to terminate grand jury proceedings. The appeIlant sought a writ of mandamus, aIleg
ing grand jury abuse, which requires exceptional, compeIling circumstances and places a
heavy burden on the petitioner. The court found such a drastic intervention unwarranted
and found that the petitioner'S interests were protected by Rule 6(e). In United States v.
Dunham Concrete Prods., 475 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir. 1973), the court stated that "apart
from the question whether appeIlants have standing to remedy the aJleged breach of grand
jury secrecy, the remedy in any case would not be to dismiss the indictment."
239. 610 F.2d at 221 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 221-22. See supra notes 130-80 for a discussion of the distinctions be
tween civil and criminal contempt.
241. But see United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985), where the defend
ant was convicted of participating in the distribution and sale to grand jury targets of im
printed carbon sheets used in the typing of secret grand jury testimony. The defendant was

1990]

FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e)

293

In United States v. Eisenberg,242 the United States Court ofAp
peals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order grant
ing to the defendant the names of all the government employees
"responsible for the egregious violations of Rule 6(e) that have already
caused them great harm"243 after newspaper artiCles revealed details
of the investigation. The court delineated the· procedures to be fol
lowed once a prima facie case of breach of grand jury secrecy was
established. The government's appeal did not challenge the district
court's finding of a prima facie showing of governmental leaks of
grand jury materials to the press. Rather, the government limited its
challenge to the order requiring that it release all the names of govern
ment employees responsible for the leaks.
The district court had ordered the government to conduct an in
house investigation to identify all the· government officials who had
participated in the investigation. In balancing the targets' need to stop
the leaks of prejudicial pUblicity with the public interest involv~ in
protecting secrecy, 244 the appellate court found that the sanctions
should be limited to the extent "necessary to stop the publicity and
punish the offenders."24s The appellate court agreed with the district
court's order to identify the responsible government officials, but de
nied the relief requested by the grand jury targets that they should
have access to this list. The court could· inspect such information, in
camera, but the court, limited in its supervisory role of the grand jury,
could not make the list available to those under investigation.
The court of appeals acknowledged that inj1,lnctive relief was the
best remedy for targets of grand jury investigations alleging leaks vio
lative of Rule 6(e). "While the grand jury is in session, the only inter
to stop the prejudiCial pUblicity and to seek the
ests of the targets

are

convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982). The defendant argued
that conviction under the statute was unwarranted because the exclusive language of Rule
6(e) precludes application of any other statutory framework for his behavior and that he
was not one of the persons covered by an obligation of secrecy under the rule. The court
found that he was correct in asserting that he was not covered by grand jury secrecy under
Rule 6(e), and that the language "no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person
except in accordance with this Rule" precluded the court from expanding the persons cov
ered. However, the court found the language imposing contempt on violators covered by
the rule did not mandate that other individuals could destroy grand jury secrecy and escape
criminal sanction. Id. at 675.
242. 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983).
243. Id. at 961.
244. Id. at 964.
245. Id. at 966.

294

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 12:245

punishment of individuals guilty of Rule 6(e) violations."246 The
court did not address any distinctions between civil and criminal con
tempt, but chose instead to focus on the limits of the supervisory
power of the judiciary over the grand jury.247 While stating that the
grand jury is neither a part of the judiciary nor the executive branches
of the government, the court went on to "place no restrictions on the
[district court's] power ... to order an investigation of the govern
ment's alleged violations of Rule 6(e). We can conceive of circum
stances where a district court could seek the appointment of a special
counsel to assist the court in determining whether Rule 6(e) violations
had occurred."248 Given such freedom to investigate, it is unclear
where this court would draw its lines to respect the' separation of pow
ers doctrine which limits the courts in its responsibilities for, and pow
ers over, the grand jury. Perhaps the reluctance to interfere with the
grand jury stemmed not only from the traditional independence of the
grand jury, but also from respect for the Executive's increasingly pow
erful role before the grand jury.
Prior to Blalock v. United States,249 the federal courts addressed
the need for contempt sanctions when other remedies were considered
too drastic. Although there was a willingness to acknowledge the rem
edy because it was expressly authorized and had traditionally been
used to supervise the grand jury, there was an apparent lack of willing
ness to impose it upon government attorneys. The remedy was consid
ered less drastic than others that were potentially available to targets
of grand jury investigations, although the possible effects on an attor
ney cited for contempt could hardly be cOnsidered benign. There had
been little analysis in the cases up to this point of what Congress in
tended when it authorized contempt in the 1977 amendments to Rule
6(e). The focus in some of the cases2SO and in law review articles 2S1
had been on.the parameters of the expanded language in Rule 6(e) of
"attorneys for the government." Perhaps the lack of clarity at the
congressional level on whether civil discovery could take advantage of
broad grand jury investigatory powers, had obscured useful debate on
246. Id. at 964. The court cited the Lance decision for authority on the role of the
target's counsel in any hearings involving contempt sanctions. Id. at 965.
247. Id. at 964-65.
248. Id. at 966.
249. 844 F.2d 1546 (l1th Cir. 1988).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
251. See, e.g., Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 38; Walker, supra note 90; Note,
supra note 77; Comment, Administrative Agency Lawyers' Presence in the Grand Jury
Room: Rules to Prevent Abuse, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 159 (1979).
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the less drastic remedies available to targets who 'allege abuse of the
grand jury.
V.

THE BLALOCK AND BARRY DECISIONS

Two recent federal courts of appeals decisions have examined the
issue of whether the contempt provision in Rule 6(e) for violations of
grand jury secrecy is a criminal and/or civil sanction. In Blalock v.
United States,252 the majority opinion analyzed the target's motion
under the Lance requirement for what is necessary for a prima facie
showing of secrecy violations. However, the special concurrence re
jected the reasoning in Lance and recognized criminal contempt as the
sole contempt sanction for grand jury secrecy violations. 253 In Barry
v. United States,254 the majority accepted the reasoning in Lance and
found that Rule 6(e) violations included civil contempt sanctions and
equitable relief, whereas the dissent in Barry agreed with the restric
tive interpretation of the Blalock special concurrence.
A.

Blalock v. United States 255

In Blalock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling denying relief to the target of a
grand jury investigation. The target had applied to the district court
for an order permanently enjoining the grand jury from investigating
charges of bid rigging and fraud in the construction of Georgia Power
Company's nuclear power plant at Vogtle. The grand jury evidence
had been gathered primarily by agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves
tigation who collaborated with investigators from Georgia Power
Company.
The target alleged that the prosecutor had used the subpoena
power of the grand jury to assist private investigations; that the prose
cutor and the FBI had improperly remarked that they intended "to
break [appellant] or run him out of business"; that the prosecutor had
told a witness that the appellant might harm her; and that the prose
cutor and the FBI made unauthorized disclosures of matters before
the grand jury.256 This last allegation implicated Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e). This allegation was supported by an affida
vit from a potential witness who claimed to have been asked similar
252. 844 F.2d 1546 (l1th Cir. 1988).
253. ld. at 1553 (Tjoftat, J., Roettger, J., specially concurring).
254. 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
255. 844 F.2d 1546 (l1th Cir. 1988).
256. ld. at 1548.
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questions by the power company investigators and the grand jury.2S7
Appellant also claimed that the FBI questioned potential grand jury
witnesses in the presence of investigators for the Georgia Power Com
pany and consequently grand jury matters were disclosed to the power
company investigators. 2s8 Appellant also alleged that the prosecutor
told a competitor that the grand jury would soon indict him, which
was an unauthorized disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury.2S9
The district court denied injunctive relief, stating that it found,
after reading the grand jury transcripts in camera, that the prosecutor
and the FBI agents had behaved properly.260 The court also noted
that the target had an adequate remedy at law, a motion for dismissal
of the indictment if one were handed down. 261 The court's remark
that it doubted the truth of appellant's allegations, in light of the ex
emplary behavior of. the government officials, prompted the appellant
to move for the recusal of the court in the current controversy. The
court denied the motion for recusal. 262
On appeal, the district court opinion was affirmed. First, the
court of appeals found that appellant had an adequate remedy at
law263 through which to address any due process claims he might
have. Second, the court focused on the binding precedent which per
mitted a grand jury target to seek injunctive relief against the individu
als covered by Rule 6(e)(2) and allowed the target to invoke the civil
contempt power of the court to coerce compliance with an injunctive
order. 264 Following Lance, the court of appeals used the criteria sug
gested there to determine if the appellant presented sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case against the government officials. 26s The
appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that no such case
had been established and affirmed the district court's conclusion that
. the appellant's proof was inadequate or not credible.
.1.

The Special Concurrence

The special concurrence addressed the issue of whether Federal
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
quired for

Id. at 1548-49.
Id. at 1550.
[d.
[d. at 1549.
[d. at 1550.
[d. at 1552.
[d. at 1549.
[d. at 1551.
See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of what is re
a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation.
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides a- grand jury target a
right -of action for injunctive relief to prevent grand jury leaks and
whether the contempt in the rule was intended by Congress to be civil
or criminal.266 The two judges asserted that Rule 6(e)(2) is nothing
more than a statement by Congress that the law found in 18 U.S.C.
section 401 (1982), subjecting persons to criminal contempt and
thereby punishment for misconduct, applies to the wrongful disclosure
by persons of "matters occurring before the grand jury."267 Criminal
contempts in federal courts are handled as section 401 proceedings. 268
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) provides for notice to the
alleged contemnor and the procedure to be used in criminal contempt
proceedings. 269 The concurrence stated that under Rule 42(b) the per
son bringing the alleged offensive behavior to the court's attention
does not have the right to compel the court to action.270
In reviewing the Lance decision, the special concurrence reiter
ated the four requirements for a prima facie showing of a violation of
Rule 6(e). In holding that this appellant failed to establish a prima
facie case for official misconduct, the special concurrence stated that
the Lance opinion failed to analyze the threshold question of whether
a grand jury target has the right to seek injunctive relief against gov
ernment officials. 271 The special concurrence offered a four-step de
ductive argument that must be made in order for tpe Lance holding to
be valid:
First, the premise is assumed Rule 6(e)(2) authorizes the district
court to use its civil contempt power to obtain compliance with the
Rule's secrecy requirements. Second, because civil contempt lies
only to enforce an injunctive order, it follows that Congress gave
the district courts the authority to enjoin persons subject to the
Rule's secrecy requirements from the improper disclosure of grand
jury matters. Third, since injunctions are adjudicative rather than
administrative orders, they must be entered in article III "cases or
controversies" between parties. Fourth, a proper party for bringing
suit for injunctive relief is the target, because the target is the person
whose interests Rule 6(e)(2)'s secrecy requirements were designed
to protect. 272
266. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552, 1553, 1556-60 (Tjoflat, J.,Roettger, J., specially
concurring).
267. Id. at 1553.
268. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
270. 844 F.2d at 1553 (Tjoflat, J., Roettger, J., specially concurring).
271. Id. at 1554.
272. Id. at 1555.
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The special concurrence rejected that reasoning because it was
based on the premise that the contempt in the rule was civil, whereas
the court argued that the legislative history demonstrated that the con
tempt envisioned by the Rule 6(e) is solely criminal. The court's inter
pretation of the legislative history from the 1977 hearings was· that the
rule as amended "codified a practice the district courts had been fol
lowing for eighty years, "213 where common law breaches of grand jury
secrecy had been prosecuted as criminal contempt of court. 274 After
the codification of grand jury secrecy in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1946, courts continued the practice of prosecuting viola
tions as criminal contempt. 275 The special concurrence stated that the
words "knowing" and "punished" are further evidence of the intent to
maintain only a criminal sanction. Further evidence was in the Senate
Report which' stated that "the Rule ... provid[es] a clear prohibition,
subject to the penalty ~fcontempt."276
The special Concurrence emphasized the purpose of the two types
of contempts as further evidence of the congressional intent. Criminal
contempt is punitive, not remedial. The purpose of civil contempt is
to force compliance with an injunction, not to punish past conduct. 277
The concurring judges used a hypothetical to suggest that civil con
tempt in a Lance-type situation is futile because the prosecutor can
only promise to stop leaking grand jury materials to end the imprison
ment for the civil contempt which makes it particularly useless as a
safeguard for ensuring grand jury secrecy.278
273. Id. at 1556.
274. /d. at 1557.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1558 (citing SENATE 'REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CoDE CoNG.

277.

&
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527,531).

Id. at 1559.
In Blalock, the specially concurring judges stated as a way of illustrating the

278.
uselessness of civil contempt:
Posit a case in which the prosecutor leaks to the press grand jury infonnation
concerning the target. Pursuant to the rule established in Lance, the target moves
the court to order the prosecutor to show cause why he should not be held in civil
contempt and sanctioned. The court issues the order, and at the show cause hear
ing, the prosecutor admits responsibility for the disclosure. Suppose further that
the court does not sanction the prosecutor, but rather warns the [sic] him that it
will tolerate no further disclosure-as the district court did in Lance. The prose
cutor, however, continues to leak additional grand jury matters to the press. On
the target's application, the court holds another show cause hearing, finds that the
prosecutor violated the Rule, and concludes that the issuance of a civil contempt
sanction is now necessary to ensure future compliance with the Rule. Believing
that a fine will not ensure compliance, the court chooses to incarcerate the prose
cutor .... [T]he court advises the prosecutor that his incarceration will be tenni
nated just as soon as he obeys the law.... [H]e can purge himself of the contempt
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Additionally, the special concurrence suggested that because
there is no civil contempt contemplated by Rule 6(e)(2), there is no
right to injunctive relief, since that goes hand in hand with civil con
tempt. Breaches of secrecy brought to the court's attention would be
dealt with'under the court's supervisory power and the court would
"take administrative steps to ensure the maintenance of secrecy."279 If
the court was satisfied that a knowing violation had occurred, it could
cite the violator for criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. section 401 in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 42(b). Failing that, the target could bring the disclosure to
the attention of the United States Attorney who could proceed with an
indictment under section 401. If the court or prosecutor refused to
grant a motion for sanctions, the target would have no recourse be
cause such decisions are not appealable. At that point, the target
would be "simply a member of the public who has complained to the
prosecutorial authority that a crime may have occurred."280
The special concurrence, in positing a situation where the appel
lant can establish that the government violated Rule 6(e), remained
convinced that criminal contempt was the contempt remedy envi
sioned by Congress and the only one that is functional in such circum
stances. The specially concurring judges' opinion provided a good
basis for a discussion of the sanctions that are useful and desirable to
both the court and the target of an investigation. While the Barry
court held that civil contempt, as contemplated in Lance, was an ap
propriate remedy, the majority also recognized that the judges in Bla
lock were merely following binding precedent.
and obtain his release from custody by not making further disclosures of grand
jury matters .
. . . [He must] convince the court, albeit with a self-serving promise, that he
will not disclose these matters in violation of the Rule....
The prosecutor promptly makes such a promise, but the court is not con
vinced; consequently, he will remain in custody indefinitely, until the court
changes its mind.... [T]he prosecutor's previous disregard of the Rule's prohibi
tion renders his promise worthless in the eyes of the court. The court's decision
therefore transformed the case from a proceeding for civil contempt into one for
criminal contempt. The prosecutor is not being held in custody to coerce his
future compliance with the Rule's secrecy requirement; rather, he is being pun
ished for his past misdeeds. The law, however, precludes such a transformation;
the court's only option, therefore, is to order the prosecutor's release upon his
mere promise to obey the law.
Id. at 1559-60 (footnote omitted). But see In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(The district court purged a grand jury witness of civil contempt of court upon his promise
to testify upon the condition that he be given a transcript of his testimony.).
279. 844 F.2d at 1561.
280.. Id.
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B. Barry v. United States 281
In Barry, Mayor Marion Barry sought remedial relief and sanc
tions against the government in a grand jury investigation examining
official misconduct. His allegations included leaks from the grand jury
to the press in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2).
The allegations of leaks from the grand jury were supported by news
paper and television reports and press releases from the United States
Attorney. Barry claimed that these leaks were interfering with his
ability to perform his official functions. 282 He sought an order for a
show cause evidentiary hearing to determine if contempt ~anctions
should be imposed, The district court found that the sanctions sought
were civil and that Mayor Barry "failed to carry his burden to estab
lish a prima facie case of prosecutorial misconduct based on violations
of Rule 6(e)."283 The appellate court agreed that the cause of action
was civil but reversed the district court, holding that Barry did have
sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case. 284
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the cause of action under Rule 6(e) could be civil and
that "[e]very circuit that has considered the matter has recognized
that a civil cause of action, either for equitable relief or civil contempt,
is cognizable under Rule 6(e)(2)."285 The court found further that eq
uitable relief in the form of ordering the government to stop the leaks
was appropriate. ':[T]he Rule indicates no limits on the relief available
to address violations. "286
The court disagreed with the special concurrence in Blalock
which would limit the scope of Rule 6(e) to criminal contempts. 287
Because Rule 6(e) does not explicitly provide for either civil or crimi
nal contempt, the critical issue was the purpose of the proceeding.
Since Mayor Barry was asking for prospective relief, an end to the
grand jury leaks, the court stated that this necessarily required a civil
remedy as opposed to the punitive sanction of criminal contempt.
After characterizing the Blalock special concurrence as an "unu
sual decision," the dissenting judge agreed that only criminal sanctions
281. 865 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also In re Sealed Case, 865 F.2d 392 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
282. Id. at 1319.
283. Id. at 1318.
284. Id. at 1324.
285. Id. at 1321.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1324 n.6.
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are allowed under Rule 6(e).288 The "official opinion" in that case
belies the real analytic dispute. "Since we are not so bound, I would
not inject into the decisional stream of this Circuit the virus already
infecting the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits due to the Lance
exposure."289
The Blalock and Barry opinions analyzed whether the contempt
provision in Rule 6(e) is criminal and/or civil. The distinction is im
portant because of the consequences to the alleged contemnor in terms
of due process and to the complaining party in terms of the type of
relief that may be granted. Prior to the Lance decision, there was little
useful analysis on the statutory limits of contempt under Rule 6(e).
The following section will discuss the debate surrounding the nature of
the contempt provision in Rule 6(e)(2) and attempt to explain the
analysis that restricts or expands the remedies available to grand jury
targets for breach of secrecy.
VI.

CRIMINAL AND/OR CIVIL CONTEMPT IN FEDERAL RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e)

The special concurrence in Blalock underscores the heuristic
value of the debate surrounding the contempt provision in Rule 6(e),
because current case law recognizes both criminal and civil contempt
as possible remedies under the Rule. Both Lance and Barry interpret
Rule 6(e) to permit civil, as well as criminal contempt, whereas the
Blalock special concurrence found that criminal contempt is the exclu
sive contempt remedy envisioned by Congress. The special concur
rence in Blalock and the majority opinion in Barry will be the focus of
this analysis. Given the limited remedies available to targets and the
potential consequences to targets and contemnors, it is important to
explore the possibilities and ramifications of both civil and criminal
contempt in this context.
In Blalock, the conclusion· of the special concurrence that the
contempt provision in Rule 6(e) is solely criminal, was based on an
interpretation of the text and legislative history of the 1977 amend
ments. Additionally, the judges concluded that civil contempt was not
useful to deter future prosecutorial misconduct. The Barry majority
concluded that the text did not expressly limit the type of contempt
and that the prospective and coercive nature of civil contempt in pre
indictment publicity cases was particularly useful because it did not
interfere with the grand jury.
288. Id. at 1326 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 1327.
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An analysis-of whether the contempt provision in Rule 6(e) is
criminal or civil includes the overarching consideration of the histori
cal purposes of grand jury secrecy, as well as the legislative history of
the 1977 amendments. The practical applications of civil and criminal
contempts, including the statutory uses, will be considered along with
the Supreme Court's decisions and interpretations of the tradition in
American criminal procedure. This analysis concludes that the reme
dies available to targets for violations of grand jury secrecy are limited
and that absent specific restrictions by Congress in the rule itself or to
the inherent supervisory power of the judiciary generally, "contempt"
in the rule should be broadly interpreted to afford protection to the
targets and to uphold the fair administration of justice.
Section A of this analysis discusses the remedies available to
targets who allege secrecy violations under Rule 6(e), concluding that
contempt is the most appropriate remedy because of the specific au
thorization in the rule and the judicial willingness to recognize it. Sec
tion _B discusses the legislative history of the 1977 amendments, which
is unclear as to the congressional intent behind the contempt provi
sion. Section C discusses the inherent supervisory power of the courts
over federal grand juries and concludes that the separation of powers
doctrine precludes Congress, absent clearly restrictive language, from
limiting a judicial decision to only one type of contempt if constitu
tional and statutory requirements are met in the adjudication of the
contempt.
A.

Remedies for Grand Jury Secrecy Violations

Although contempt is expressly authorized in Rule 6(e), it is not
viewed as the exclusive remedy for breaches of grand jury secrecy.
Before deciding that contempt is the appropriate remedy, the court
may want to assess "the stage of the proceedings and the cost, incon
venience, and administrative difficulties created by alternative reme
dies."290 Sanctioning the prosecutor may "aggravate an already
hostile situation"291 from the defendant's perspective. The defendant
wants relief that prevents or hampers the criminal investigation. The
court's disciplinary measures taken against the prosecutor represent
little effective relief from the defendant'S perspective. Even though a
defendant may assert that society'S interest in fairness is ill-served
290. THE GRAND JURY PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESEN
TATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES }3·79 (3d ed. 1989); see also B.
GERSHMANN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 6.4 (1989).
291. THE GRAND JURY PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note
290, at 13-79.
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when prosecutors violate the rights of defendants and long-established
rules of practice and procedure, it is undoubtedly not the main goal of
any request for relief. Courts need to balance the individual's needs
for effective relief against society'S interest in prosecuting criminals
and the fair administration of justice.
As noted in the discussion of the cases,292 dismissal of the indict
ment is viewed as an "extreme" remedy rarely granted to defendants.
There has been no consistent standard for dismissal 293 of an indict
ment because the facts and circumstances, including the perceived
level of prosecutorial misconduct, vary in each case. Even if the court
dismisses the indictment, there is the possibility of reindictment if the
dismissal was without prejudice. 294 If the defendant can be reindicted,
there remains the question of whether the prosecutor is effectively de
terred from such conduct in the future. Given the almost certain pos
sibility of reindictment, it is less certain that such a remedy is as
"extreme" as the courts imply. However, the cost and administrative
inefficiency of reindictment, and possibly even retrial, are great and
will probably be considered ~hen entertaining a motion for dismissal.
Grand jury secrecy violations that amount to preindictment publicity
will almost never rise to the level of prejudice required for dismissal of
an indictment.
There is some question if violations of grand jury secrecy even
rise to the level of "prosecutorial misconduct." In United States v.
Dozier,29s the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found that the prosecutor's unlawful disclosures to the press amounted
merely to "prosecutorial indisct:etion at the grand jury level. "296 The
defendant's concern that any defendant would be "understandably re
hictant" to institute contempt proceedings against the government at
292. See supra notes 181-289 and accompanying text.
293. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (The court may
not dismiss an indictment absent prejudice to the defendant.).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1980). Defendants
were indicted for filling prescriptions with fictitious names. The defendants alleged viola
tions of grand jury secrecy among other abuses before the grand jury. The court dismissed
the indictment without prejudice because there was no showing that unlawful disclosures
operated to prejudice their right to an unbiased grand jury or infringed upon their rights to
a fair trial on the merits. The defendants had a right to an unbiased grand jury, but "no
concomitant right to bar forever investigation into their alleged criminal conduct." Id. at
172.
295. 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
296. Id. at 545; see also United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 499 (D.c. Cir.
1983) ("Since the concern over adverse pUblicity is its effect on the fairness of the ensuing
trial, ... it was not error to fail to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the effect of pre
indictment publicity on the grand jury.").
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torneys who had not yet indicted him, was noted in a footnote as
precisely the remedy sought in Lance. 297 The court found the remedy
of contempt adequate to deter prosecutorial misconduct because "[t]he
touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the
prosecutor."298
Similarly, motions to terminate grand jury proceedings are rarely
successful. It is more likely that courts will exercise their supervisory
power in a narrower way299 to enjoin a specific illegal practice, such as
unlawful disclosure of grand jury matters. 3OO Most courts recognize
that contempt of court is the appropriate remedy.301 In the Lance
case, the court fashioned a remedy that combined an injunction to stop
leaks to the press with an order that the prosecutor show cause why he
should not be held in civil contempt. Many courts have recognized
civil contempt under Rule 6(e),302 but the Blalock special concurrence
was the first court to suggest that a more narrow reading of the rule
was required. 303
1.

Contempt of Court in Lance, Blalock, and Barry

The Barry and Lance cases are factually similar: both targets ex
plicitly requested injunctive relief in the form of demands to stop the
leaks to the news media from the government attorneys. Mayor
Marion Barry and Bert Lance are both public figures whose activities
were newsworthy. In contrast, only Blalock's activities were news
worthy; Blalock was a private figure. In Blalock, the allegations in
volved leaks to private investigators who potentially could proceed
with a civil action against Blalock, whereas in Barry and Lance, the
297. 672 F.2d at 545 n.lO.
298. Id. at 545 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982».
299. See United S~tes v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Ordinarily,
the secrecy rule is enforced by the sanction specifically provided in the rul~punishment
for contempt of court.").
300. See supra notes 181-289 and accompanying text.
301. See M. FRAN:KEL & G. NAFrALIS, supra note 2, at 133 ("[E]fforts to prevent or
punish leaks from grand juries have been remarkably feeble. Probably the main practical
obstacle to effective control has been the power and protected positions of those primarily
involved with the delivery and dissemination of illicitly leaked information-the prosecu
tors and the media. ").
.
302. Advance Publications v. United States, 805 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983); Hunter v. Civella, 673 F.2d 21t" (8th
Cir. 1982); Lance v. United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980); Scott v.
United States, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978,581
F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978).
303. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lance
dissent.
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concerns were reputational damage and possible future prejudice of
the grand jury and/or a jury trial. Assuming the "correctness" of the
holdings, Lance and Barry both established a prima facie case,
whereas Blalock's evidence was insufficient.
The facts and the holdings are not the important distinguishing
characteristics of the cases for this analysis. The analytic dispute in
these cases -centers on what relief is available to the target of a grand
jury investigation when allegations of Rule 6(e) violations on the part
of the government are presented to the court. In considering what
relief is available to the target of a grand jury probe, the federal regula
tions 304 must be considered to determine the underlying procedural
and theoretical rationale for the exercise of the contempt power.
In the case of leaks of grand jury matters by government attor
neys, contempt is expressly authorized by Congress, and it has the
advantage of interfering only marginally with the grand jury investiga
tion,30s a primary consideration. Given the limited remedies available
to a target for alleged leaks of grand jury materials, contempt becomes
more attractive as one of the few remedies regularly acknowledged by
the courts. Although courts are reluctant to sanction prosecutors, this
is the least drastic remedy and may prove useful to targets if courts
would use it in ways that effectively serve the dual needs of protecting
targets' rights by upholding the traditional respect for secrecy and so
ciety'S need to have a fair and effective administration of the criminal
laws.
The Blalock special concurrence was critical of the analysis in the
Lance opinion and pointedly offered a hypothetical 306 to demonstrate
the futility of civil sanctions in a Lance-type situation. The hypotheti
cal did not factor in the historical importance of grand jury secrecy to
the target. If the target is afforded some realistic concern, then the
rights afforded the target should be more than mere admonitions to
the prosecutor or delayed administrative efforts to control the leaks.
The rights of the individual are no greater than the remedy. In the
context of injunctions in "leak" cases, the remedy of injunction is
worth no more than the contempt sanction which enforces the injunc
tion. If, as posited, the injunction and subsequent coercive imprison
304. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
statutes regulating contempt.
305. But see M. FRANKEL & G. NAFfALIS, supra note 2, at 23 ("An independent
grand jury would be intolerable. The meaningful issues relate to the nature and character
of the prosecutorial leadership, the presence or absence of safeguards and countervailing
powers, and the nature of the authority formally invested in the grand jury.").
306. See supra note 278 for the text of the hypothetical.
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ment of the prosecutor are useless to effectuate the petitioner's prayer
for relief, it is no more a "relief" to the petitioner if the prosecutor
stays imprisoned for a determinate period of time to vindicate society's
interest in justice. To eliminate the possibility of civil contempt be
cause it may not be effective, is probably to cut off the target from any
meaningful remedy.
There remains the question of what standard attaches to a crimi
nal contempt. If the behavior must be willful, then a determination of
the prosecutor's intent307 is necessary. If there must be an obstruction
of justice, it is questionable that leaks amounting to "prosecutorial in
discretion" will ever rise to that level. To label the contempt solely
criminal is to further discourage its use. Courts are generally reluctant
to punish governmental abuses of grand jury secrecy and a require
ment of criminal intent308 will make the task even more difficult for
the target and for the. courts that want to correct abuse.
The special concurrence in Blalock stated that the cases involving
contempts for violations of grand jury secrecy proceeded under the
theory of 18 U.S.C. section 401. 309 Section 401 is based on the Judici
ary Act of 1789, as implemented by the Act of March 2, 1831, enacted
to limit and define contempt in the federal courts. This section ap
pears to apply solely to criminal contempts because there is no men
tion of civil contempt. However, 18 U.S.C. section 402 arguably
contemplates civil contempt because of its provisions for fines paid to
complainants. "[I]tis tacitly assumed that [section] 401 operates as a
limitation of the power of federal courts with respect to civil contempt
actions."310 If it is not assumed that sections 401 and 402 apply to
civil contempt, the inevitable conclusion would be that courts have
free rein under their inherent supervisory power with respect to civil
contempt. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) distinguishes be
tween civil and criminal contempt only in regard to notice to the con
307. See Moskovitz, supra note 153, at 794, stating:
On occasion courts have concluded that a contempt proceeding was criminal be
cause the defendant's acts were wilful. In civil contempt the general rule is that
the defendant need not have acted wilfully, and this would seem correct, inas
much as civil liability for damage done ought not to depend on whether or not
the defendant has a "guilty mind."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
308. Because some acts constitute both civil and criminal contempt, willfulness does
not preclude civil contempt. [d.; see also United States v. Smith, 815 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir.
1987) (Knowledge is the culpable mental state for violations of Rule 6(e)(2). Because the
rule specifically supplies the culpable mental state, that is the element to be proved.).
309. Blalock, 844 F.2d 1546,1557 n.14 (11th Cir. 1988).
310. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 117, at 169.
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temnor in a criminal contempt. 311
Additionally, the Blalock special concurrence pointed out that
section 402 did not apply to improper disclosure of grand jury materi
als because criminal contempt is not a crime. 312 The 1946 enactment
of Rule 6 codified the common law rule of secrecy breaches, which
was "a crime at common law."313 If violations of Rule 6(e) are a
crime, then section 402 would apply, opening up to the possibility that
civil-type remedies are available to a target of a grand jury probe. Fur
thermore, the federal courts view criminal' contempt as a crime,314
since "it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable
by fine or imprisonment."3IS Such a conclusion has procedural conse
quences for the contemnor, but it also opens up the possibility that
civil-type remedies are available to the person harmed by the improper
disclosures.
The problem is further complicated by the blurred distinctions in
contempt proceedings and court orders. 316 To illustrate the dual char
acter of some contempt sanctions, the following hypothetical is useful:
For example, if a court imposes a gag order to prevent jurors from
being influenced by media reports of a trial, the order is apparently
intended to benefit the parties by ensuring a fair trial. If one party
violates the gag order, that party could be found in civil contempt
for prejUdicing the rights ohhe other party, or in criminal contempt
for flouting the authority of the court, or both. Enforcing compli
ance through civil contempt proceedings would protect the rights of
the other party and vindicate the court's authority at the same
time. 317
The Blalock special concurrence's sole emphasis on the purpose
of vindicating the court's authority, rather than providing a remedy to
the complainant, fails to address the dual nature of some requested
relief. The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the proceeding
can be difficult to determine and should not be the controlling factor in
characterizing the contempt. The contempt power allows a judge to
fine or imprison a person who willfully violates court orders and to
311. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 42.
312. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1558 n.17.
313. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1946 enact
ment of Rule 6(e).
314, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
315. Id. at 201 ("Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense ....").
316. See supra notes 130-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc
tions between criminal and civil contempt.
317. Note, supra note 105, at 382-83.
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award damages to someone injured by such behavior of the contem
nor. Given the dual purpose and possible double remedy the judge
may award in such a case, the contempt partakes of both criminal and
civil contempt. In the present situation, the injunction is designed to
restrain the prosecutor from leaking grand jury information to the
press and to others not bound by secrecy in the rule. The prosecutor's
imprisonment for a determinate sentence to vindicate the authority of
the court does little to compensate the complainant, although it may
deter further breaches.
Although in the instant cases the targets did not-request mone
tary damages, it is possible that an unindicted target of a grand jury
investigation who was harmed by newspaper stories could seek con
tempt sanctions against the government and request compensatory
damages for loss of reputation. 318 The court would then uphold its
integrity with criminal sanctions against the contemnors and compen
sate the complainant injured by the conduct. If the contempt proceed
ing protected the due process requirements of the alleged contemnor,
there is no analytic reason to avoid such remedies. 319 However, the
major problem when the judiciary desires both coercive and punitive
sanctions is the constitutionally compelled safeguards required in a
criminal proceeding. Judges have discretion in classifying contempt,
but they should use this discretion for "the least possible power."320
Ironically, it is secrecy which makes it difficult for the target to
know precisely which of his rights may be threatened by the govern
ment's behavior. "In contemporary experience, the effort to enforce
secrecy is too frequently defeated by 'leaks.' And where a defendant
wishes (after indictment, naturally) to see what went on before the
318. Note, Private Prosecutors in Criminal Contempt Action.. Under Rule 42(b) a/the
Federal Rules a/Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1986). Immunity
may preclude damages paid to the target in situations where the prosecutor is the
contemnor.
319. See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904) ("It may not be
always easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes. It
may partake of the characteristics of both."). In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911), the Court stated:
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often
serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. . . .
It is true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental effect. For
if the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindica
tion of the court's authority. On the other hand, if the proceeding is for criminal
contempt . . . the complainant may also derive some incidental benefit from the
fact that such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the disobedience.
Id. at 441-43.
320. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945).
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grand jury, the claims for secrecy have tended to be pushed by prose
cutors beyond the fair limits of their logiC."321 In grand jury investiga
tions, the target must rely on the system's respect for rules and the
integrity of the prosecutor because the work of the grand jury is
shielded from the pUblic. The judge should be able to use criminal
sanctions precisely because the effective and fair functioning of the sys
tem is crucial to ensure actual fairness and the public's perception of
fairness. The accused in trial has adequate safeguards: the right of
confrontation and cross-examination; the right to testify and call wit
nesses on his own behalf; the right to refuse to testify on grounds of
self-incrimination; and the right to know the charges against him. 322
All this is denied to the target of a grand jury investigation. Theoreti
cally, the target is protected from any harm until after an indictment is
returned. However, as the concerns over the 1977 amendments to
Rule 6(e) demonstrate, secrecy is a double-edged sword easily worked
to the government's advantage when the loosening of restrictions is
met with an ineffective safeguard for the target.
The conduct at issue in these cases constitutes indirect contempt
because the violation occurs not in the presence of the judge or in the
court, but under circumstances where only a few people know directly
about the facts concerning the disclosures. The target may only later
be affected by the public disclosures that allegedly prejudice the grand
jury or the subsequent trial on the merits. Arguably, the government's
conduct in each case is obstruction of justice and/or failure to observe
the rules of the court. In so doing, the government affected the rights
of the grand jury targets. Because indirect contempts occur outside
the judge's presence, they must be brought to the court's attention.
321. M:FRANKEL & G. NAFTALlS, supra note 2, at 24; see also Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959), where Justice Brennan in dissent stated:
Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy is
maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends
or when the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing
interest in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted, for to do so in such a
circumstance would further the fair administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the
court stated:
Thus, it is important to note that the common law concept of grand jury
secrecy developed from a need to protect the jurors and the accused from the
tyranny of the Crown . . ..
. . . [I]t must be remembered that the policy of grand jury secrecy should be
maintained to the full extent necessary to fulfill the ends ofjustice, and no further.
Id. at 568-70 (citation omitted).
322. Note, supra note I, at 599-600.
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The target is the person most interested in seeing that such abuses are
corrected. If the target is limited to the remote possibility that the
prosecutor will be "punished" by the court, it is unlikely that the tar
get will initiate any action. Without the vigilance of the targets or any
realistic hope that anything can or will be done for secrecy breaches,
the court will remain in the dark as to the prosecutorial practices
before the grand jury.
Unlike most courts, the judges in the principal cases decided in
advance what kind of sanction would be imposed. All three of the
cases arguably had aspects of both criminal and civil contempt. Lance
wanted to stop leaks that would harm his reputation; Barry wanted to
stop leaks that were interfering with his ability to perform official
functions; and Blalock suggested that grand jury leaks would prejudice
the outcomes at the grand jury. All three wanted to enjoin the prose
cutor from illegal behavior. Factually, Blalock's case resembled more
of the interest society has in guaranteeing a fair process, vindicating
the court's authority. He asked for injunctive relief to stop the grand
jury from investigating him, not coincidentally the relief that would
most hamper future government investigations. Even if Blalock had
brought the alleged misconduct to the court's attention and requested
criminal sanctions against the contemnors, it is doubtful that he would
have prevailed. At a minimum, the civil remedy for Rule 6(e) viola
tions allows the target an opportunity to present evidence of the al
leged leaks, whereas the criminal sanction is entirely dependent upon
the court or prosecutor's willingness to proceed. 323 The varied pur
poses served by grand jury secrecy in any given circumstance should
dictate the nature of the sanction. Grand jury secrecy historically pro
tects the innocent and defies the intrusion of the government into in
dependent inquiries by the "people's panel."324 Although the reality
today is that the government guides the grand jury, the legislative his
tory of Rule 6(e)(2) indicated a respect for the traditional safeguard of
protecting the innocent from unfounded charges and public disclosure
of matters under investigation.
323. See United States v. Blalock, 844 F.2d 1546, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988). Although
stating that the court can take administrative steps to ensure the maintenance of secrecy,
the specially concurring judges did not specify wha~ those steps would be: In any case,
those steps would have to involve some way of stopping· the leaks, an intervention that
could conceivably involve an injunction, bringing the process full circle to civil contempt.
If the district court declines to act, the target has no recourse on appeal. The problem with
this thinking is that the target is the injured party, while the court is only an injured party
in a secondary sense.
324. R. YOUNGER, supra note 41.
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B. Legislative History of the 1977 Amendments .

The legislative history ofthe 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) must
be read in light of the dual policy rationale expressed by the Senate of
assisting the government in effective law enforcement and allaying the
fears of those who anticipated abuse of the system. It is also necessary
to clarify exactly what abuse was contemplated by Congress when it
considered the 1977 amendments. The contempt sanction was added
specifically to curb abuse by the prosecutor. 325 Although the con
tempt sanction. had been used prior to 1977 to ensure grand jury se
crecy, this language expressly authorized contempt and presumably
was to encourage the vigilance of the jUdiciary against prosecutorial
misconduct. 326
The early cases relied upon by the special concurrence in Blalock
to support the proposition that Congress was merely codifying existing
practice did not involve prosecutorial abuses. In In re Sum
merhayes,327 the court charged a grand juror with criminal contempt.
There was no dispute as to the purpose of the contempt, which was to
uphold the proper administration of the laws. There was also an indi
325. In the Blalock special concurrence, the judges cited the legislative history of the
1977 amendments to Rule 6(e). 844 F.2d at 1556. The specially concurring judges omitted
the phrase "such prosecutorial power" when discussing the specific language in the SEN
ATE REPORT;supra note 7, referring to the fears expressed at the Hearings, supra note 94.
326. But see Hearings, supra note 94, at 151-53, 157-58, where concerns were ex
pressed about the potential abuse of grand jury secrecy by the expansion in the rule:
Given that history-given that oath-l submit that intrusion on grand jury se
crecy by the Government surely cannot be automatically permitted solely on the
undocumented belief of a prosecutor that there must be disclosures to assist him
in his duties.
· .. [p]erhaps we would do better to put such boundless faith in our institu
tions and principles rather than in the uniform reliability of Government person
nel. That more conservative and traditional view has vivid history to recommend
it.
· .. [S]ecrecy has become a one-way street.
· . . Who is going to try to hold the Government in contempt?
Only one person and that is a convicted accused, who is probably the person
that you are least interested in in some ways, and then it is after he has been
convicted and he doesn't have too much of a shot at contempt.
The idea that a contempt sanction serves any function is nonsense.... How
do you prove bad faith after the fact? How?
There is another thing with the contempt remedy that is wrong.... [T]he
entire burden is put on the party charging that the breach was not justified.
Id. (testimony of B. Nussbaum).
.
327. 70 F. 769 (N.D. Cal. 1895). See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Summerhayes.
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cation that the grand juror had possibly engaged in other criminal be
havior. His revelations of grand jury matters were for the purpose of
bribery and corruption. Given such a circumstance there is little rea
son to expect the court to do anything but vindicate its authority and
possibly proceed with other criminal charges. 328
In Schmidt v. United States,329 the breach of secrecy was by the
attorneys for the accused, not by the government officials involved in
the investigation. The contempt was considered criminal with no
analysis of other remedies. However, the facts of Schmidt are distin
guishable from the principal cases in this Note, because in Schmidt,
the target was not asking the court for any relief, rather the court was
interceding on its own behalf to vindicate its authority and protect the
grand jury's secrecy. The remedy applied in Schmidt fit squarely with
an analysis based. on the purpose of the proceeding to vindicate the
court's authority rather than remedy a wrong to an individual.
The other early case mentioned by the judges in Blalock was
Goodman v. United States. 330 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit traced the punishment that had been meted out for
violations of grand jury secrecy:
So strict was ~he requirement of secrecy in this respect that an
ciently a grand juror who disclosed to an indicted person the evi
dence that had been given against him was held to be an accessory
to the crime, if the crime was a felony, and a principal if the crime
was treason; and later such conduct appears to have been de
nounced as high misprision. Nowadays, in the absence of special
statute providing a different method of punishment, a grand juror
may be held in contempt for disclosing grand jury proceedings to an
outsider. 33 I

These early cases are evolutionary and it is unrealistic to cite them in
support of the proposition that Congress was merely enacting existing
practices in 1977 when it approved the amendments to Rule6(e).
On the other hand, if these cases do represent congressional re
spect for past practices, they are a narrow comer of the reasons for
using the contempt power to maintain judicial integrity at the grand
jury level. It is unlikely that the final sentence of Rule 6(e) was a
codification of all the remedies pertaining to the scope of power left to
328. 70 F. at 773.
329. 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940). See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Schmidt.
330. 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939). See supra note 183 for a discussion of Goodman.
331. 108 F.2d at 519 (citation and footnote omitted).
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the discretion of the courts. One possible interpretation that comports
with the Blalock special concurrenCe reasoning is that Congress did
indeed intend criminal contempt because of the seriousness with
which it viewed secrecy violations. However, given the separation of
powers doctrine and the existing power of courts to uphold their dig
nity and authority through inherent power, Congress indicated no ob
jection to the judicial fashioning of a civil contempt remedy in
combination with an injunction in preindictment pUblicity cases.
When the federal rules were enacted in 1946, this type of breach was
recognized as a serious problem. "Conspicuous pUblication in a news
paper of large circulation that the conduct of certain persons is under
investigation . • . is contempt of court. Offenders may be thereby
warned that their conduct is under investigation. "3.32
If Congress had intended to curtail or limit the judiciary's use of
contempt while striking a balance between government agency access
to grand jury materials and grand jury secrecy, the legislative history
would presumably have been more clear. It is more reasonable to as
sume that Congress left the courts free to fashion remedies, while en
couraging the use of at least criminal contempt, and guiding the courts
by the broad purposes of the rule. The Supreme Court, in United
States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.,333 interpreted the 1977 legislative his
tory precisely in the light of the historic reasons for preserving grand
jury secrecy, while holding that the Department of Justice may not
have automatic access to grand jury materials for civil litigation when
the information was disclosed for reasons of technical assistance.
Congress is also aware of the judiciary's inherent powers and
there is no indication that it intended to curb the use of such powers in
this context. Contempt is considered integral to the effective function
ing of the courts. "[A]ny attempt to regulate it will be viewed as cut
ting at the pulsebeat of the court, and will be examined with intense
judicial scrutiny."334 In addition to an awareness of the importance of
contempt, Congress also was aware of the common law importance of
grand jury secrecy. The original Rule 6 embodied the "traditional no
tion of secrecy," and one of the stated purposes was to protect the
individual defendant from reputational harm which can be great in
such proceedings. Congress intended to protect such people, albeit
with a sometimes less than effective safeguard.
332. Orfield, supra note 175, at 403.()4 (footnote omitted).
333. 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
334. Comment, supra note 113, at 1119.
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The dangers and injustices which result from unauthorized dis
closure of grand jury proceedings have been summarized as follows:
The reputation of the innocent is ruined when such statements
are made public and in fact no wrongdoing may exist or be charged
or found.
2. If erroneous, such stories are extremely difficult to rebut be
cause the sources are not stated, and because erroneous assertions
could only be contradicted by revealing the very investigative infor
mation which is supposed to be secret.
3. Defendants who are in fact charged may be depriVed of a fair
trial because of the previous notoriety of the publicized version of
the pre-indictment investigation.
4. Trial of defendants who are in fact guilty is rendered difficult
because of the problem of finding an impartial jury.
5. Premature disclosure of investigations may jeopardize them by
making witnesses more difficult to obtain or may lead to the de
struction of evidence. 335
1.

The potential harm for breaches of grand jury secrecy in this con
text can be great. The courts' reluctance to impose criminal sanctions
on government attorneys, coupled with the presumption of regularity
of grand jury proceedings, can be insurmountable to a target who sus
pects prosecutorial misconduct. One of the "catch 22" problems with
motions that interfere with the grand jury is the fact that the defend
ant's action may propel the investigation further into the limelight,
somewhat defeating his claim that preindictment publicity is undesir
able. If the courts continue to think criminal sanctions too harsh a
penalty absent systemic abuse, then targets of grand jury investigations
who suspect unlawful disclosures will be less inclined to move forward
with any remedies that would benefit the system. Judges may not be
aware of prosecutorial misconduct unless it is brought to their atten
tion by those most affected by the abuse.
C.

Supervisory Powers and Independence of the Grand Jury 336
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can regulate

335. Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitu
tional Rights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1976) [herein
after Senate Hearing]; Committee on Civil Rights; Committee on Criminal Courts, Law
and Procedure; Committee on Federal Courts, Strengthening the Role ofthe Federal Grand
Jury: Analysis and Recommendations, 29 REC. A. B. CITY N.Y. 464, 473 (1974).
336. See generally United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1953) (The Court
stated that the purposes of supervisory power are threefold: "to implement a remedy for
violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction
rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury; and finally, as a remedy
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the contempt power. 337 The federal courts were created by acts of
Congress and their power and duties depend upon the act of calling
them into existence. However, the Supreme Court has also recognized
that the "power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courtS."338
"These powers of the courts are in general not subject to negation by
the higher courts or by outside agencies,"339 with the exception of the
regulatory statutes that limit but do not define the distinctions between
criminal and civil contempt.
The federal statute regulating contempt is 18 U.S.C.section 401.
This statute regulates criminal contempt. There is no federal statute
regulating civil contempt other than 28 U.S.C. section 1826 covering
Recalcitrant Witnesses. This raises the question whether section 401
also regulates civil contempts:
[W]hile a virtual revolution in procedure has transformed the law of
criminal contempt during the last decade, little has changed in the
procedures for civil contempt.... [A]rguments for a unitary proce
designed to deter illegal conduct." (citations omitted»; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943) (This case is generally regarded as the one which advanced supervisory power as
an independent basis of decision.); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power o/the Federal
Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1050 (1965) ("[S]upervisory power has become a catch-all
doctrine . . . . The sole common denominator of its usage is a desire to maintain and
develop standards of fair play in the federal courts more exacting than the minimum
constitutional requirements of due process.").
337. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), which stated:
But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the prac
tical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at
liberty to exercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them. The inter
ests and dignity of those who created them, require the exertion of the powers
indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation.
Id. at 226. But see Brautigam, supra note 115, at 1514-15, stating that "[o]ne can hardly
deny that in creating a judiciary the constitutional framework contemplated that courts
must be granted all powers essential to their operation. However, the claim that the con
tempt power is one such essential power should be accepted only with reluctance."
338. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). See generally Dowling,
Inherent Power o/the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635, 636 (1935) (Inherent power is "essential
to the existence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal and from the
very fact that it is a court."); Kuhns, supra note 109, at 496, stating:
These [powers] arguably include the power to define and determine penalties for
affronts to its authority, both in the absence of any legislation proscribing contu
macious conduct and also, perhaps, in situations in which existing legislation
either does not proscribe certain conduct deemed contumacious by the judiciary
or does not provide a penalty adequate to vindicate the court's authority.
Id. But see id., supra note 109, at 497 (stating that "the Supreme Court has never struck
down any congressional regulation of the contempt power."). The regulations in §§ 401
402 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 do not infringe upon any interest the judi
ciary may have in functioning as an independent branch of the government. Id. at 499-500.
339. Orfield, supra note 175, at 441.
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dure ... were resisted on the grounds that the traditional safeguards
then available in criminal contempt were unnecessary in civil con
·
340
tempt proceedmgs....

If such reasoning prevails, then the statutory limitations apply to
civil and criminal contempts, and consequently, the procedures used
will not be dispositive of the nature of the contempt. In such cases,
the distinction once again turns on the relief granted or the purpose of
the proceeding: vindication of the court's authority or coercion to en
force the court's orders for the benefit of a petitioner. The regulatory
statutes do not specify what type of misbehavior constitutes contempt.
In this light, Rule 6(e) is unique because the conduct that brings about
the contempt citation is clearly improper disclosure of grand jury
materials. The question for the court becomes not what conduct elic
its a contempt citation, which can often be the initial inquiry. Rather,
the question becomes one of how to proceed, under what statutes, and
whose rights are being protected or vindicated. If this is determined at
the beginning of the adjudication, the regulatory scheme falls into
place.
In addition to contempt, the jUdiciary under its inherent power
can dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct. 341 The
Supreme Court has recently decided that courts should exercise their
authority to dismiss indictments only when the alleged misconduct
prejudiced the accused. 342 The question in deciding the appropriate
340. Fink, supra note 118, at 70. See supra notes 309-15 and accompanying text for
the special concurrence's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 401-402.
341. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979), where the court
recognized:
that dismissal of an indictment may impose important costs upon the prosecution
and the public. At a minimum, the government will be required to present its
evidence to a grand jury unaffected by bias or prejudice. But the costs of contin
ued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial. This IS particularly
so before the grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without the check of a
judge or a trained legal adversary, and virtually immune from public scrutiny.
The prosecutor's abuse of his special relationship to the grand jury poses an enor
mous risk to defendants as well. For while in theory a trial provides the defend
ant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the charges against him, in
practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating personal
and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo. Where
the potential for abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken indictment
so serious, the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of the
judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspond
ingly heightened.
Id. at 817; see also United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
342. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988). "[T]he District
Court had no authority to dismiss the indictment on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct
absent a finding that petitioners were prejudiced by such misconduct. The prejudicial in
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ness of other less drastic relief for the petitioner is whether anything
short of dismissal deters future misconduct. Because federal courts
have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with the grand jury, the
final sentence of Rule 6(e)(2), added in 1977, which permits contempt
of court sanctions against those who breach grand jury secrecy, has
greater significance as an effort to encourage the courts to use their
supervisory powers to correct or punish specific Misconduct.
Although the grand jury has historically developed as an in
dependent body, it is under the supervision of the courts. The court
has power to enforce the investigative functions of the grand jury, be
cause a grand jury may "so exceed its historic authority as to justify a
court in interfering with its investigatorial power."343 This indepen
dence was one of the reasons the grand jury has been accorded such
wide latitude. 344 However, the courts are reluctant to directly con
front procedures and practices of prosecutors. This reluctance has di
minished the importance of the grand jury as "a bulwark against
despotism" since the prosecutor can now virtually control the grand
jury. "Today, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor
who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any
quiry must focus on whether any violations had an effect on the grand jury's decision to
indict." Id. at 263; see also United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (The Supreme
Court held that a guilty verdict at trial cured any defect relating to lack of probable cause
at the grand jury level.). But see United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir.
1986) ("Mechanik was carefully crafted along very narrow lines .... The Supreme Court
in Mechanik did not hold that a Rule 6 violation of any sort ... which affects the funda
mental fairness of the criminal proceedings discovered prior to trial is not justiciable after
conviction."); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Supervi
sory power can be exercised to impose an 'ad hoc sanction' to enforce the appropriate
performance of the government in presenting evidence to the grand jury." (citing United
States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 778 (2d Cir. 1976), cen granted, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), cen
dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978»).
343. Cain v. United States, 239 F.2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1956); see also United States
v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring) ("Our supervi
sory power is not limited to control of conduct that occurs at trial; we have specifically
found it to extend to matters involving the grand jury. ").
344. See Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Ill. 1939), where the court
stated:
A grand jury is a part of the court machinery, an all-important element in
the agency of the government endowed with judicial power .... It has remained
for the courts, tracing the history of the grand jury from the time of early Eng
land, to determine for themselves when, upon a particular set of facts and circum
stances, a question is presented, just how far a grand jury may properly go or
should be allowed to go.
Id. at 850-51; see also United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1952)
("[TJhere can be no support for the position that the grand jury is an independent planet
divorced from the court.").
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time, for almost anything, before any grand jury."34S This transition
from the grand jury as a method of protecting the rights of the individ
uaP46 to acting as an arm ofthe state is striking in light of the histori
cal development of the grand jury. This gradual usurpation of power
has resulted in secrecy that now "shields" the actions of the
prosecutor.347
If the remedies are to be interpreted narrowly, the prosecutor is
less likely to have an incentive to respect the target's rights in grand
jury investigations. The doctrine of separation of powers may help
explain the judicial reluctance. However, considering that some
courts will go as far as dismissing indictments for egregious abuse of
the system as a way of curtailing prosecutorial misconduct, it is unnec
essarily confining to interpret Rule 6(e) as a restriction on judicial dis
cretion. Another possible interpretation from the legislative history of
the 1977 amendmenis is that Congress, given the concerns expressed
at the hearings, wanted to encourage the judiciary to use contempt
sanctions.
.
Perhaps the historical respect for the independence of the grand
jury is outmoded considering the complicated nature of much modem
litigation. Because the prosecutor guides the grand jury, he should be
more readily sanctioned for abusing its process. The judiciary, under
its inherent power, is in the best position to curtail or prevent such
abuse. 348 "The grand jury is under control by the court to the extent
345.
(1973).

Campbell,

Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174

346. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) ("[T]he most valuable function of
the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between
the prosecutor and the accused.").
347. Senate Hearing, supra note 335, at 105, which stated:
[T]he grand jury would be "a shield for the innocent and a sword against corrup
tion in high places." How often down through the years have courts invoked
these words or similar rhetoric to justify the grand jury's powerl But how seldom
have these noble words borne any resemblance to the reality of the grand jury's
actual role in our criminal justice system!
... We have a situation where an American jurist can accurately assert that
"(t)he prosecutor can violate or bum the Bill of Rights seven days out of seven
and bring the fruits of unconstitutional activity to a grand jury. No court in the
country has the power to look behind what the grand jury considers or why it acts
as it does."
Id. at 105-06 (quoting Baltimore Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. in Footlick, How to Get
Your Man, NEWSWEEK, Dec. I, 1975, at 113).
348. Note, supra note 336, at 1078, stating:
The supervisory power is often exercised to prevent or correct injustice where
existing procedures have proved inadequate.. " . [I]t is ... undesirable that an
injustice go uncorrected simply because it is not susceptible to correction by tradi
tional remedies. . . . [S]upervisory power serves the modem legal system in a
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that it is organized by the court and the legality of its proceedings are
determined by the court in accord with the statutes. Its members are
subject to the supervision and control of the court for any violation of
their duties.... It may discipline the attorneys, the attendants, or the
grand jurors themselves for breach of secrecy."349
CONCLUSION

Civil contempt should be a remedy available to those adversely
affected by leaks in grand jury investigations. A narrow interpretation
which precludes civil contempt is not warranted by the legislative his
tory of the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e). Additionally, because of
the inherent supervisory powers of the judiciary, such a limitation is
unnecessarily restrictive considering the grand jury's judicial function
and the ex parte nature of the proceedings. Given the historic reasons
for grand jury secrecy and the stated reasons in Supreme Court deci
sions, it is unnecessary to give a narrow reading to a rule whose ex
plicit purpose is to protect against further erosion by the government
of the safeguards guaranteed to targets of grand jury investigations.
The secret nature of the preindictment phase of a prosecution al
lows the government great latitude in the conduct of an investigation
that can irreparably prejUdice the defendant both at the grand jury
phase and at trial. Encouraging the court to exercise its discretionary
powers to fashion effective remedies which do not interfere with the
work of the grand jury will protect the defendant, respect the inherent
power of the court, and uphold the fair and effective administration of
justice.
Janice S. Peterson

manner closely resembling the role played by early equity, and represents the
finest feature of modem supervisory power.

Id.
349. Orfield, supra note 175, at 440-41 (footnote omitted).

